Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action

Abstract

Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group must have beliefs about the beliefs of the other members. But in spite of the fact that this so-called 'interactive knowledge' is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive knowledge. In this paper, we argue that such an account is necessary for any adequate analysis of collective intention. Furthermore, we argue that an application of Robert Aumann's theory of interactive knowledge may be used to address several puzzling features of collective intention. 1 A variety of different terms referring to such actions have been adopted in the action theory literature, including 'collective action', 'joint action', 'social action', and 'shared cooperative activity'. Although these different terms often have different meanings, we shall refer to any action brought about by a group of agents, and requiring coordination among those agents, as a 'collective action' .

Exploring the attitudes to and uptake of biosecurity practices for invasive non-native species: views amongst stakeholder organisations working in UK natural environments

“…Beyond this, rational economic decisions about whether to undertake biosecurity also hinge upon beliefs about whether other environment users are participating or not (since non-participation by any single environment user can introduce INNS, thereby undermining the efforts of others). As discussed, these suspicions about inaction present a particularly difficult barrier to overcome (and one typically found at the core of collective action problems) (Chant and Ernst 2008). However, our evidence of the need for organisations to be seen to be doing the right thing could incentivise biosecurity regardless of the failings of others.…”

Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency

“…Nor does it mean that common knowledge doesn't facilitate robustness, efficiency, and flexibility in our joint endeavours. Finally, it doesn't mean that common knowledge isn't necessary for two agents to launch a rationally coordinated joint attack in circumstances where failure of coordination is very costly (see Chant and Ernst [2008: …”

Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge

“…Our main point of contention with existing accounts is the epistemic condition on shared intentions (Chant and Ernst 2008). This is the condition regarding what group members know or believe about each other.…”