Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge

Dragos, Chris

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02461-w

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 98 publications

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“…Moreover, a study by Dragos [18], appropriately influenced by recent cognitive science research on distributed cognition and extended mind, introduces the so-called epistemic extension.…”

Section: Autonomy and The Political Sidementioning

confidence: 99%

Autonomy and the Ownership of Our Own Destiny: Tracking the External World and Human Behavior, and the Paradox of Autonomy

Magnani

2020

Philosophies

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Research on autonomy exhibits a constellation of variegated perspectives, from the problem of the crude deprivation of it to the study of the distinction between personal and moral autonomy, and from the problem of the role of a “self as narrator”, who classifies its own actions as autonomous or not, to the importance of the political side and, finally, to the need of defending and enhancing human autonomy. My precise concern in this article will be the examination of the role of the human cognitive processes that give rise to the most important ways of tracking the external world and human behavior in their relationship to some central aspects of human autonomy, also to the aim of clarifying the link between autonomy and the ownership of our own destinies. I will also focus on the preservation of human autonomy as an important component of human dignity, seeing it as strictly associated with knowledge and, even more significantly, with the constant production of new and pertinent knowledge of various kinds. I will also describe the important paradox of autonomy, which resorts to the fact that, on one side, cognitions (from science to morality, from common knowledge to philosophy, etc.) are necessary to be able to perform autonomous actions and decisions because we need believe in rules that justify and identify our choices, but, on the other side, these same rules can become (for example, as a result of contrasting with other internalized and approved moral rules or knowledge contents) oppressive norms that diminish autonomy and can thus, paradoxically, defeat agents’ autonomous capacity “to take ownership”.

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“…Moreover, a study by Dragos [18], appropriately influenced by recent cognitive science research on distributed cognition and extended mind, introduces the so-called epistemic extension.…”

Section: Autonomy and The Political Sidementioning

confidence: 99%

Autonomy and the Ownership of Our Own Destiny: Tracking the External World and Human Behavior, and the Paradox of Autonomy

Magnani

2020

Philosophies

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“…If God made it crooked by design, then the implication is that free will is just another 'hevel', more smoke and mirrors, supposedly.5 AsCunningham and Fitzgerald (1996) pointed out long ago, epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with what can be created as knowledge, where it can be found, and how it advances. Briefly speaking, therefore, autonomous epistemology simply refers to the assertion that in order for an individual to claim independent possession of knowledge, they must at the same time be in full possession of the epistemic materials out of which this knowledge developed(Dragos, 2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Kohelet’s Escape: The Heart Freely Subordinated to Divine Navigation

Grenier

2023

pharosjot

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It is often claimed that Ecclesiastes constitutes an irremediable enigma which flies in the face of traditional Hebrew cosmology, making the author’s intended meaning not much more than a bewildering speculative task. Biblical scholars disagree on just about every aspect of this ancient Hebraic work: authorship, date, structure, narrative framework, and even its connection to a Creator God. This essay utilizes Ballantine’s strategic rhetorical perspective to introduce and wade through some of the central controversies and debates about the meaning of Ecclesiastes: Is earthly life meaningful or meaningless ? Is there eternal meaning to earthly life or not? Is the earthly life of human beings pointless and futile or not? If the simple pleasures of earthly life are gifts from God, then how can earthly life itself be ‘hevel’? and more. Somewhat surprisingly, it concludes that Ecclesiastes is anything but an enigma when viewed rhetorically, and certainly not in contravention of basic Hebraic and Christian biblical principles about the sovereign importance of believing in God and obeying the Commandments, even despite all the trials and tribulations offered by earthly life.

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Group (epistemic) competence

Pino

2021

Synthese

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In this paper, I present an account of group competence that is explicitly framed for cases of epistemic performances. According to it, we must consider group epistemic competence as the group agents’ capacity to produce knowledge, and not the result of the summation of its individual members’ competences to produce knowledge. Additionally, I contend that group competence must be understood in terms of group normative status. To introduce my view, I present Jesper Kallestrup’s (Synthese 1–19, 2016) denial that group competence involves anything over and beyond the aggregation of individual competences. I have divided my response into two parts. First, I compare two conceptions of competence from Ernest Sosa’s reliabilist virtue epistemology (Sosa in Philos Stud 142:5–15, 2009; Philos Perspect 24:465–475, 2010a; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, 2010b; Judgment & agency, Oxford University Press, 2015; Epistemology, Princeton University Press, 2017; in: Silva-Filho, Tateo (eds), Thinking about oneself: The place and value of reflection in philosophy and psychology, Springer, 2019) and David Löwenstein’s (Know-how as competence. A Rylean responsibilist account, Vittorio Klostermann, 2017) account of know-how. Second, I take the results from this comparison and apply them to the issue of group know-how, by the hand of Orestis Palermos and Deborah Tollefsen’s twofold approach to the topic (Palermos and Tollefsen, in: Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Socially extended epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2018). Finally, I return to Kallestrup’s denial to make my point in favour of the conception of genuine group competence as the group normative status to achieve success.

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Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge

Cited by 4 publications

References 98 publications

Autonomy and the Ownership of Our Own Destiny: Tracking the External World and Human Behavior, and the Paradox of Autonomy

Autonomy and the Ownership of Our Own Destiny: Tracking the External World and Human Behavior, and the Paradox of Autonomy

Kohelet’s Escape: The Heart Freely Subordinated to Divine Navigation

Group (epistemic) competence

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