Group (epistemic) competence

Pino, Dani

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03294-2

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(22 reference statements)

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“…6 See Koscholke (forthcoming) for an example of group knowledge without group belief. 7 For discussion of the notions of group competence and group virtue, see Fricker (2010), Kallestrup (2016), Lahroodi (2007), Palermos (2020), andPino (2021). 8 Weaker truth norms may be formulated in terms of p approximating truth or p being likely to be true.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge

Broncano‐Berrocal

Barba

2022

Philosophical Issues

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Under what conditions is a group belief resulting from deliberation constitutive of group knowledge? What kinds of competences must a deliberating group manifest when settling a question so that the resulting collective belief can be considered group knowledge? In this paper, we provide an answer to the second question that helps make progress on the first question.In particular, we explain the epistemic normativity of deliberation-based group belief in terms of a truth norm and an evidential norm, introduce a virtue-reliabilist condition on deliberative group knowledge, and provide an account and a taxonomy of the types of group competences that are necessary for this type of collective knowledge. GROUP DELIBERATION AND GROUP KNOWLEDGEDeliberation is a practice or activity in which we weigh reasons to settle the question of whether p or to decide whether to φ. It can serve epistemic or non-epistemic purposes and be guided by epistemic or non-epistemic considerations (e.g., practical, moral, etc.). It can be done individually or in a group. In the first case, the weighing of reasons takes place entirely (or at least substantially) in the mind of an individual. In the second case, deliberation is mediated, at least in part, by a communication process, either within a group or between groups, in which beliefs, evidence, information, arguments, etc. concerning the question of whether p or the decision whether toThis is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…77For discussion of the notions of group competence and group virtue, see Fricker (2010), Kallestrup (2016), Lahroodi (2007), Palermos (2020), and Pino (2021). …”

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Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge

Broncano‐Berrocal

Barba

2022

Philosophical Issues

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“…In developing these dis nc ve and promising accounts of joint know-how, these authors all acknowledge its context-specificity (compare also Martens 2021, Pino 2021). Yet they aim, like most philosophers, at analyses that are general enough to cover many different cases and kinds of case.…”

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Affective, Cognitive, and Ecological Components of Joint Expertise in Collaborative Embodied Skills

Sutton

2024

Expertise

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To better understand the nature of joint expertise and its underlying processes, we need not only analyses of the general conditions for skilled group action, but also descriptive accounts of the features and dimensions that vary across distinct performances and contexts, such as sport and the arts. And in addition to positioning our accounts against current models of individual skill, we need concepts and lessons from work on collaborative processes in other cognitive domains. This paper examines ecological or situational components of expert joint action in practice, then offers a selective survey of some key cognitive and affective resources that shape and transform group performance.

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The boundaries of gnoseology

Navarro,

Pino

2024

Philos Stud

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According to Sosa (2015, 2021), the domain of epistemic normativity divides into gnoseology and intellectual ethics, a boundary that results from the key notion that gnoseological assessments are telic. We share this view here and highlight the implications that the telic claim has for different debates in contemporary epistemology. However, we also raise the complaint that Sosa’s analogy of the archer has suggested that this boundary aligns with those of the instant of cognitive performance and its attributability to an individual, as featured in the Cartesian fundamental epistemic question: What should I believe now? Against this Cartesian imprint, we claim that temporality and sociality may be constitutive features of gnoseology. In order to show this, we introduce alternative analogies of belief formation processes that illustrate how cognitive achievements may be collectively attained across time, features that may manifest as an epistemology of conversation.

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Group (epistemic) competence

Cited by 4 publications

References 41 publications

Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge

Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge

Affective, Cognitive, and Ecological Components of Joint Expertise in Collaborative Embodied Skills

The boundaries of gnoseology

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