Environment, governance, controls, and radical innovation during institutional transitions

Picturing firms' institutional capital-based radical innovation under China's institutional voids

“…With regard to FIC, to encourage endogenous innovation, governments can provide firms with financial support in the form of subsidies or favorable taxation policies to shelter them from competitive pressures (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001;Yi et al, 2012). Such support renders firms more capable of continuous investment in experimental activities and more endurance until success can be achieved (Tellis et al, 2009).…”

“…Moreover, government provided financial support, technical information and knowledge, and favorable policies all enhance firms' perceptions of safety (White, Varadarajan, & Dacin, 2003) and resource availability (Reid & De Brentani, 2012). Such implicit encouragement of innovation can render firms more willing to commit to, and more confident about implementing, radical innovation (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001;Reid & De Brentani, 2012;White et al, 2003;Yi et al, 2012).…”

“…The aforementioned "not invented here" barrier can be lowered by a record of prior success (West & Bogers, 2013), which implies that prior positive experience of SOEs (non-SOEs) leads to relatively open attitudes toward the use of FIC (IIC). Moreover, the Chinese government has implemented a number of policies to foster technical innovation (Yi et al, 2012); because SOEs were established to fulfill political and social expectations (Zhang & Keh, 2010), their managers have a tradition of fulfilling political requirements regardless of the risks and costs involved; a tradition that has become the taken-for-granted assumption underlying their behavior and decisions (Guan, Yam, Tang, & Lau, 2009). In this case, although the integration of scientific knowledge (i.e., FIC) into firms' R&D activities may require fundamental changes in existing routines (Weigelt, 2009), such changes may be perceived as more acceptable for SOEs than for non-SOEs.…”

“…This is particularly the case in China's transitional economy (Bao, Chen, & Zhou, 2012;Zhou & Li, 2012), where ongoing institutional transitions are shaping the competition landscape. The result is a range of uncertainties that firms need to buffer against and/or eliminate (Bao et al, 2012;Zhou & Li, 2012), but the underexplored market regime equally leaves vast spaces to conquer (Yi, Liu, He, & Li, 2012). Furthermore, firms' and the country's inferior position in the international marketplace motivates them to attempt to triumph in a "David and Goliath" battle (Chandy & Tellis, 1998;Tellis, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2009).…”

Belső kontrollrendszerek intézményesülése hazai üzleti szervezetekben

“…Yi és társai 585 kínai cégen belül vizsgálták a menedzsmentkontroll-rendszerek intézményesülését és a radikális innovációk összefüggését (Yi et al, 2012.). Williamson a COSO-ERMrendszer kritikája kapcsán leírja cikkében a vállalati kockázatkezelés intézményesülését (Williamson, 2007(Williamson, ., pp.1105(Williamson, -1107.…”