Ensuring political responsiveness: politicization mechanisms in ministerial bureaucracies

Abstract

Although politicization is a perennial research topic in public administration to investigate relationships between ministers and civil servants, the concept still lacks clarification. This article contributes to this literature by systematically identifying different conceptualizations of politicization and suggests a typology including three politicization mechanisms to strengthen the political responsiveness of the ministerial bureaucracy: formal, functional and administrative politicization. The typology is empirically validated through a comparative case analysis of politicization mechanisms in Germany, Belgium, the UK and Denmark. The empirical analysis further refines the general idea of Western democracies becoming 'simply' more politicized, by illustrating how some politicization mechanisms do not continue to increase, but stabilize -at least for the time being. Points for practitionersThe claim of increasing politicization of the interaction between ministers and civil servants is often made in research and government practice. As the completely neutral bureaucracy is a myth rather than empirical reality, all democracies have to balance demands for both neutral expertise and political responsiveness. The latter often involves the introduction of politicization mechanisms. Politicization comes in a variety of forms, and the article develops a typology covering formal, functional and administrative politicization. Further it empirically demonstrates how politicization mechanisms not only increase, but how they develop and interact, altering balances of neutrality and responsiveness in potentially conflicting ways.

Who's at the table? An analysis of ministers’ participation in EU Council of Ministers meetings

“…Secondly, systems may be formally politicized. Formal politicization refers to formal rules prescribing and legitimizing ministers to recruit staff using non-meritocratic criteria, rendering political recruitment possible (Hustedt and Salomonsen 2014). This may be performed as the (legitimate) recruitment of former professional civil servants into top positions in the bureaucracy or the minister recruits political and special advisers for staff functions or fully fledged political cabinets.…”

Administrative Politicization or Contestability? How Political Advisers Affect Neutral Competence in Policy Processes

“…First, we apply Eichbaum and Shaw's () theoretical framework of administrative politicization outside the Westminster context and thereby answer their call to ‘enrich our understanding of the milieu and practices of political advisers’ (Shaw and Eichbaum , p. 73; cf. also Hustedt and Salomonsen ; Connaughton ). Administrative politicization refers to political advisers' intervention in the relationship between a minister and the permanent civil service with the effect that the latter's effort to provide frank and fearless advice to the former is disturbed or obstructed (Eichbaum and Shaw , p. 343).…”

“…The concept of politicization has come to cover different aspects of the roles of political advisers, state secretaries, and civil servants, but it also refers more broadly to the functioning of modern bureaucracies (for a review see e.g. Hustedt and Salomonsen ).…”

“…Politicization thus occurs with the ‘substitution of political criteria for merit‐based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining of members for the public service’ (Peters and Pierre , p. 2). Politicization in this sense focuses on recruitment and it can be open and formal (Hustedt and Salomonsen , p. 749) or hidden and informal (Ban and Redd ). In this study, two groups can be politically recruited: political advisers and state secretaries.…”

Decentralization, District Chief Executives, and District Assemblies in Ghana's Fourth Republic

“…Hence, Locke (2004) defined politicization as the assertion of control over the civil service by politicians, and the way presidents decrease the preference divergence between themselves and executive agencies (see also Lewis ). According to Eichbaum and Shaw (), one of the ways of achieving politicization is through partisan appointment—which refers to the addition of political appointees on top of existing career civil service employees or the placing of loyal political appointees into important local government posts (Hustedt and Salomonsen ). Often, it manifests in situations where incumbent political actors ensure the attunement of bureaucrats’ behavior to their own policy preference (van der Meer ).…”