Decentralization, District Chief Executives, and District Assemblies in Ghana's Fourth Republic

Abstract

The article shows how District Chief Executives (DCEs) exert extraordinary influence on Ghana's decentralization. Analyzing data from Afrobarometer surveys and 100 interviews, the article establishes that DCEs’ position is very complex, involving the exercise of political and administrative functions aimed to influence grassroots support for the president. While politicization allowed the DCEs to perform their assigned functions, it polarized the district assemblies with assembly members divided in support of or against their policies/activities. It further led to conflict and tension between the DCEs, administrators, and Members of Parliament, which proved counterproductive to rural development. Subnational leaders who owe their position to political appointment lack autonomy to pursue grassroots preference. Yet with constitutional reforms that ensure direct election of DCEs, and the creation of a local supervisory body with review and veto powers over DCE policy and administration, responsiveness, and accountability to the people can be encouraged. This, in turn, can foster cooperation/positive interaction among the varying actors and perspectives for effective decentralization. Related Articles Related Media

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