Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right

Zwart, Sanne

doi:10.1007/s00355-009-0422-4

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Cited by 6 publications

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“…They show that imposing a quorum requirement may decrease voter turnout so severely that the expected turnout is lower than the turnout threshold. Zwart (2009) considers whether the turnout threshold can be set so that the outcome of the referendum coincides with the population preference. In her model, individual voters independently decide whether to vote or abstain, but their decisions are not strategic because each voter experiences utility according to his/her voting behavior itself and the expected outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imposing a turnout threshold in referendums

Hizen

Shinmyo

2010

Public Choice

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imposing a turnout threshold in referendums

Hizen

Shinmyo

2010

Public Choice

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Approval quorums dominate participation quorums

Maniquet¹,

Morelli

2015

Soc Choice Welf

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We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters' participation is often among the desiderata by the election designer. A participation quorum is a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below which the status quo is kept. We show that participation quorums produce incentive for partisans of the status quo to abstain, with the consequence that the status quo may be kept in situations where the planner would prefer the reform, or the reform is passed when the planner prefers the status quo. An approval quorum is a threshold on the number of voters expressing a ballot in favor of the reform below which the status quo is kept. We show that approval quorums do not suffer from the drawbacks of participation quorums. Moreover, an electoral system with approval quorum performs better than one with participation quorum even when the planner wishes to implement the corresponding participation quorum social choice function.

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Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness

Pauly

2013

Theory Decis

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Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right

Cited by 6 publications

References 28 publications

Imposing a turnout threshold in referendums

Imposing a turnout threshold in referendums

Approval quorums dominate participation quorums

Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness

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