Enhancing the Key Distribution Model in the RFID-Enabled Supply Chains

Abughazalah, Sarah; Markantonakis, Konstantinos; Mayes, Keith

doi:10.1109/waina.2014.135

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(19 reference statements)

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“…Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology that uses radio signals to identify objects [1]. An RFID system consists of a tag, a reader and a backend server [1].…”

Section: Application To Key Distribution For Rfid-enabled Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Typical applications include inventory control, animal tagging, postal tracking, airline baggage management, access control, and manufacturing processes [17]. RFID tags enable the identification, tracking and verification of products in a supply chain both automatically and in real time [1], hence their use is becoming more prevalent in manufacturing. They have the potential to store information such as batch numbers, date of manufacture, and so on.…”

Section: Application To Key Distribution For Rfid-enabled Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Localised multisecret sharing

et al. 2016

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A localised multisecret sharing scheme is a multisecret sharing scheme for an ordered set of players in which players in the smallest sets who are authorised to access secrets are close together in the underlying ordering. We define threshold versions of localised multisecret sharing schemes, we provide lower bounds on the share size of perfect localised multisecret sharing schemes in an information theoretic setting, and we give explicit constructions of schemes to show that these bounds are tight. We then analyse a range of approaches to relaxing the model that provide trade-offs between the share size and the level of security guarantees provided by the scheme, in order to permit the construction of schemes with smaller shares. We show how these techniques can be used in the context of an application to key distribution for RFID-based supply-chain management motivated by the proposal of Juels, Pappu and Parno from USENIX 2008.

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“…Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology that uses radio signals to identify objects [1]. An RFID system consists of a tag, a reader and a backend server [1].…”

Section: Application To Key Distribution For Rfid-enabled Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Application To Key Distribution For Rfid-enabled Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Localised multisecret sharing

et al. 2016

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“…To date, many researchers propose a secret-sharing based key distribution in RFID-enabled supply chains. They are classified into (1) which secret sharing scheme is used [3], [6], [7], [9], [10] and (2) secret updating schemes [5], [8], [11], [12].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secret sharing based unidirectional key distribution with dummy tags in Gen2v2 RFID-enabled supply chains

Toyoda

Sasase

2015

2015 IEEE International Conference on RFID (RFID)

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Recently, a secret sharing scheme is found to be effective to solve the key distribution problem between parties in RFID-enabled supply chains. However, there is a problem that an attacker might recover the legitimate key by collecting sufficient secret shares when products are carried in the public transportation. In this paper, we propose an effective secret sharing scheme by introducing sufficient number of dummy tags which possess a bogus secret share when the tag-attached products are conveyed. Since an attacker cannot see the tags themselves from the outside of the carrying vehicle, he/she cannot distinguish between the legitimate tags and dummy tags and thus has to find out the correct key by iteratively trying each combination of secret shares. On the other hand, the party who receives products can distinguish dummy tags since they are not attached to any product. We also adopt a file privilege and untraceable option which are newly ratified by Gen2v2 (Gen2 version 2) to realize secure and practical RFID-enabled supply chains. We prove that our construction is secure in both the privacy and robustness aspect. We also confirm that our scheme is easily implemented with the off-the-shelf RFID reader and tags.

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“…The first approach is to write encrypted EPCs instead of plaintext one. Though an encryption key must be distributed toward a partner side, many researchers solve this problem by splitting an encryption key into multiple shares with a secret sharing scheme and writing into tags on products [6], [8]- [15]. We briefly introduce the fundamental of a secret sharing scheme.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alfaro et al propose another approach to securely update the contents of tags by using a proactive (τ, n) secret sharing scheme [13]. Abughazalah et al propose to use two keys, one for cases' tags and the other for products' tags [15]. If the distributor ships tag-attached products, it newly generates the keys for cases, re-encrypts cases' EPCs, and divides the cases' keys with the secret sharing scheme to avoid an attacker from tracking products.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegal interrogation detectable EPC distribution scheme in RFID-enabled supply chains

Toyoda

Sasase

2015

2015 IEEE International Conference on RFID Technology and Applications (RFID-TA)

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An EPC (Electronic Product Code) contains sensitive information such as the product code, company code, or serial number and thus protecting the contents of EPCs is necessary to avoid counterfeits. Although many protecting schemes have been proposed, no scheme can limit the number of illegal attempts for revealing EPCs or notice whether an attacker exists. In this paper, we propose an illegal interrogation detection scheme with an EPCIS (EPC Information Service) server. The idea is to make an attacker access an EPCIS server and detect him/her. Our scheme divides an EPC into two parts with XOR operation. The first part is written into genuine tags on products while the other part is placed on an EPCIS server with an access code. An access code is divided into shares with a secret sharing scheme and they are written into genuine tags. We also write bogus shares into extra off-the-shelf tags that are not attached to any products. Since an attacker who wants to know genuine EPCs may obtain a large number of access code candidates and must try each on the EPCIS server, the server can detect and limit such illegal attempts.

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Enhancing the Key Distribution Model in the RFID-Enabled Supply Chains

Cited by 11 publications

References 11 publications

Localised multisecret sharing

Localised multisecret sharing

Secret sharing based unidirectional key distribution with dummy tags in Gen2v2 RFID-enabled supply chains

Illegal interrogation detectable EPC distribution scheme in RFID-enabled supply chains

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