Secret sharing based unidirectional key distribution with dummy tags in Gen2v2 RFID-enabled supply chains

Abstract

Recently, a secret sharing scheme is found to be effective to solve the key distribution problem between parties in RFID-enabled supply chains. However, there is a problem that an attacker might recover the legitimate key by collecting sufficient secret shares when products are carried in the public transportation. In this paper, we propose an effective secret sharing scheme by introducing sufficient number of dummy tags which possess a bogus secret share when the tag-attached products are conveyed. Since an attacker cannot see the tags themselves from the outside of the carrying vehicle, he/she cannot distinguish between the legitimate tags and dummy tags and thus has to find out the correct key by iteratively trying each combination of secret shares. On the other hand, the party who receives products can distinguish dummy tags since they are not attached to any product. We also adopt a file privilege and untraceable option which are newly ratified by Gen2v2 (Gen2 version 2) to realize secure and practical RFID-enabled supply chains. We prove that our construction is secure in both the privacy and robustness aspect. We also confirm that our scheme is easily implemented with the off-the-shelf RFID reader and tags.

Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication RFID Protocol for Blockchain Enabled Supply Chains

“…This protocol similarly was designed requiring the use of hash function to ensure the integrity of the transmitted message, which is computationally costly. Toyoda and Sasase [31] proposed a secret sharing scheme which requires to use a large number of dummy tags to solve the tracking issue faced by the approach in [28]. However, this solution has one obvious downside, where additional cost has to be incurred to purchase the extra dummy tags to be later added to the supply chains.…”

Illegal interrogation detectable EPC distribution scheme in RFID-enabled supply chains

“…The first approach is to write encrypted EPCs instead of plaintext one. Though an encryption key must be distributed toward a partner side, many researchers solve this problem by splitting an encryption key into multiple shares with a secret sharing scheme and writing into tags on products [6], [8]- [15]. We briefly introduce the fundamental of a secret sharing scheme.…”

“…In order to reduce the computation cost, they propose a secret sharing scheme that only requires XOR and addition operations. Toyoda and Sasase propose a secure and robust secret sharing scheme even if an attacker can interrogate all tags [6].…”

“…EPCs masked with random sequences are written into genuine tags on products whereas random sequences are placed on an EPCIS server with a pair of a transaction identifier t and an access code c. An access code is divided into shares with a secret sharing scheme and shares are also written into tags on products. We also prepare dummy tags, which are bogus but plausible-looking off-the-shelf tags [6], and write bogus shares into them. Since we assume that an attacker approaches a products-carried vehicle in a public area and interrogates tags from outside of it, he/she may obtain a large number of access code candidates and must try each on an EPCIS server to obtain random sequences.…”

“…An access code is divided into shares with a secret sharing scheme and shares are also written into tags on products. We also prepare dummy tags, which are bogus but plausible-looking off-theshelf tags [6], and write bogus shares into them. Since an attacker who wants to know genuine EPCs may obtain a large number of access code candidates and must try each on an EPCIS server to obtain random sequences.…”