Enforcing the European Semester: the politics of asymmetric information in the excessive deficit and macroeconomic imbalance procedures

Savage, James D.; Howarth, David

doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1363268

Cited by 34 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…11. Apart from a small fine levied on Spain for fraudulent fiscal reporting by one of its autonomous regions, exposed by the national statistical office itself (Savage and Howarth 2017).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policy co-ordination in crisis and beyond

Zeitlin

Vanhercke

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

181

143

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This contribution analyses how EU social objectives and policy co-ordination have been integrated into the Union's post-crisis governance architecture. It argues that between 2011 and 2016, there was a partial but progressive 'socialization' of the 'European Semester' of policy co-ordination, in terms of increasing emphasis on social objectives in its priorities and key messages, including the Country-Specific Recommendations; intensified social monitoring and review of national reforms; and an enhanced decision-making role for EU social and employment actors. In explaining these developments, the contribution highlights the contribution of strategic agency, reflexive learning and creative adaptation by social and employment actors to the new institutional conditions of the Semester, building on recent theoretical work on 'actor-centred constructivism' and the 'usages of Europe'.

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“…11. Apart from a small fine levied on Spain for fraudulent fiscal reporting by one of its autonomous regions, exposed by the national statistical office itself (Savage and Howarth 2017).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policy co-ordination in crisis and beyond

Zeitlin

Vanhercke

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

181

143

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…At the same time, supranational powers in economic governance were limited and severely constrained. The European Commission was tasked with monitoring the economic performance of the member states, but its powers remained subject to the political instructions and approval of the national governments (Savage and Howarth 2017).…”

Section: Theorizing Parliamentary Accountability In Multilevel Governmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the national governments cannot themselves execute the actual supervision of each other's financial and economic policies, as they want to maintain the political neutrality of the process (Savage and Howarth 2017). Hence, the logical solution is to delegate the administration of macroeconomic surveillance to a technical authority, the European Commission (Dehousse 2016: 626).…”

Section: Sidelining the European Parliament: The Suspension Of Supranmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

Crum

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

129

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How has the new structure of European Union (EU) economic governance affected the ability of parliaments (national and European) to scrutinize and control economic policy? Departing from the premise that executive power needs to be matched by appropriate parliamentary control, this contribution argues that parliamentary powers have been compromised in EU economic governance. Although budgetary powers remain formally at the national level, governments' decisions have become constrained and national parliaments find themselves on the losing side of a reinforced two-level game. This loss in parliamentary powers is not compensated at the European level, as at that level political authority is effectively left suspended between the national governments, who are unaccountable as a collective, and the European Commission, which lacks a political mandate of its own. Against this background, a final section identifies guidelines for organizing parliamentary accountability in settings, like EU economic governance, in which executive power has come to be shared across levels.

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“…First, they investigate how the Semester balances between economic and social policy priorities and objectives (see Zeiltin and Venhercke 2018;Copeland and Daly 2018). The second axis poses the question whether EU governance and the Semester are becoming more supranational or intergovernmental (see Savage and Howarth 2018). Third, scholars aim to situate the Semester's governance structure between technocratic and democratically accountable governance (see Crum 2018).…”

Section: The European Semester and Country-specific Recommendations (mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Council’s Amendments to the Country-Specific Recommendations: More than just Cosmetics?

Tkalec¹

2019

JCER

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Country-specific recommendations (CSRs) are the main policy oriented output of the European Semester economic policy coordination. This article studies the reasoning behind the Council's amendments to the Commission's initial proposals of CSRs. It uncovers internal tensions and disagreement between the two institutions that may severely obstruct the efficacy of the policy coordination process. Ultimately, this article investigates if the amendments are of any substantive relevance or merely cosmetic. Using quantitative sentiment analysis and qualitative case studies, this article concludes that the Council's amendments tend to be of substantive relevance. The main topics of disagreement between the Commission and the Council concern fiscal and social policy issues. Overall, the Council endeavours to ensure national ownership of policy recommendations by emphasising the importance of national traditions and specificities in policymaking practice.

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Enforcing the European Semester: the politics of asymmetric information in the excessive deficit and macroeconomic imbalance procedures

Abstract: The European Semester is an information-driven surveillance system that relies upon budgetary

Cited by 34 publications

References 36 publications

Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policy co-ordination in crisis and beyond

Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policy co-ordination in crisis and beyond

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

The Council’s Amendments to the Country-Specific Recommendations: More than just Cosmetics?

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