Energy-efficient power allocation for selfish cooperative communication networks using bargaining game

In cooperative communication, different ratio combining approaches can be utilized at the receiver based on the channel state information (CSI) available to the destination. In this paper, we focus on optimal energy allocation under amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperative communications when various ratio combining methods are utilized. More specifically, we consider a suite of important and fundamental problems, including signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) maximization under a weighted total energy constraint, weighted total energy minimization under an SNR constraint, weighted total energy minimization under an outage probability constraint and outage probability minimization under instantaneous weighted total energy constraint, and analyze the relationship among these problems. We first consider maximal ratio combining (MRC) and derive exact analytical solutions. To reveal the key factors in the resource allocation problem, we further transform the exact results with multiple parameters into more intuitive results with only two quantities. The resulting solutions provide a new perspective to understand optimal energy-efficient opportunistic cooperative transmissions. We then consider fixed ratio combining (FRC) and show that an explicit analytical solution does not exist to the original problem. To this end, based on the convexity proofs for the objective functions, we utilize numerical convex optimizations to obtain the unique solution. Both numerical and simulation studies are conducted to validate our theoretical analysis.

Section: Weighted Total Energy Minimization Under a Snr Constraintmentioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Snr Maximization Under Weighted Total Energy Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Energy efficient opportunistic cooperative transmission with different ratio combinings: from a new perspective

Wang

Song

et al. 2013

“…Nevertheless, these conventional quadrature signaling schemes cannot balance the diversity gain against the implementation simplicity, and thus reduce their practicality in actual communication systems. In fact, seeking a higher system performance with a lower implementation complexity is always an important direction of the people's efforts in nowadays we put more emphasis on green communications [6,7]. Particularly, the so-called threshold digital relaying (TDR) cooperative idea, in which the partner(s) decide whether or not to relay the source's signal based on the comparison between the received symbol strength and a predefined threshold, has attracted much attention as it can obtain the diversity gain and provide the implementation simplicity at the same time [8][9][10][11][12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A novel threshold-based quadrature signaling scheme for cooperative networks

Song

Shi

et al. 2014

A novel bit-error indicating scheme using only one judge threshold Chinese Science Bulletin 54, 3674 (2009); Low-complexity distributed differential spacetime coding scheme for amplify-and-forward cooperative networks Science in China Series F-Information Sciences 52, 1418 (2009); Detection time analysis for the multiple-user cooperative spectrum sensing scheme in cognitive radio networks Science in China Series F-Information Sciences 52, 1915 (2009); A threshold key escrow scheme based on public key cryptosystem Science in China Series E-Technological Sciences 44, 441 (2001);. RESEARCH PAPER. SCIENCE CHINA Information Sciences

“…Consider in commercial network where the user nodes with independent entities act highly autonomously. Since cooperative relaying represents a cost of resource, e.g., bandwidth [8][9][10][11] and power [12][13][14][15][16], the user nodes have the incentive to consume their resources solely to maximize their own benefits. In such cases, the two network objectives, i.e., fairness and efficiency, should be simultaneously considered [8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A suboptimal joint bandwidth and power allocation for cooperative relay networks: a cooperative game theoretic approach

Zhang

Ding

Yang

et al. 2012

Self Cite

In commercial networks, user nodes operating on batteries are assumed to be selfish to consume their resources (i.e., bandwidth and power) solely maximizing their own benefits (e.g., the received signal-tonoise ratios (SNRs) and datarates). In this paper, a cooperative game theoretical framework is proposed to jointly perform the bandwidth and power allocation for selfish cooperative relay networks. To ensure a fair and efficient resource sharing between two selfish user nodes, we assume that either node can act as a source as well as a potential relay for each other and either node is willing to seek cooperative relaying only if the datarate achieved through cooperation is not lower than that achieved through noncooperation (i.e., direct transmission) by consuming the same amount of bandwidth and power resource. Define the cooperative strategy of a node as the number of bandwidth and power that it is willing to contribute for relaying purpose. The two node joint bandwidth and power allocation (JBPA) problem can then be formulated as a cooperative game. Since the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to the JBPA game (JBPAG) is computationally difficult to obtain, we divide it into two subgames, i.e., the bandwidth allocation game (BAG) and the power allocation game (PAG). We prove that both the subgames have unique NBS. And then the suboptimal NBS to the JBPAG can be achieved by solving the BAG and PAG sequentially. Simulation results show that the proposed cooperative game scheme is efficient in that the performance loss of the NBS result to that of the maximal overall data-rate scheme is small while the maximal-rate scheme is unfair. The simulation results also show that the NBS result is fair in that both nodes could experience better performance than they work independently and the degree of cooperation of a node only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to improve its own performance.