Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models

Hoffmann, Magnus; Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.001

Cited by 21 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…Hoffmann and Rota‐Graziosi () consider a general two‐player contest model and they qualify previous results by showing that a sequential structure does not always result if the order of moves is endogenized. Most importantly, they assume that the prize to be awarded in the contest may depend on the chosen efforts.…”

supporting

confidence: 64%

Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests

Balart¹,

Flamand²,

Gürtler

et al. 2018

J Public Economic Theory

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Groups competing for a prize need to determine how to distribute it among their members in case of victory. Considering competition between two groups of different size, we show that the small group's sharing rule is a strategic complement to the large group's sharing rule in the sense that if the small group chooses a more meritocratic sharing rule, the large group wishes to choose a more meritocratic rule as well. On the contrary, the large group's sharing rule is a strategic substitute to the small group's sharing rule, hence the timing of choice is crucial. For sufficiently private prizes, a switch from a simultaneous choice to the small group being the leader consists in a Pareto improvement and reduces aggregate effort. On the contrary, when the large group is the leader, aggregate effort increases. As a result, the equilibrium timing is such that the small group chooses its sharing rule first. If the prize is not private enough, the small group retires from the competition and switching from a simultaneous to a sequential timing may reverse the results in terms of aggregate effort. The sequential timing also guarantees that the small group never outperforms the large one.

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supporting

confidence: 64%

Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests

Balart¹,

Flamand²,

Gürtler

et al. 2018

J Public Economic Theory

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“…Observe that strategies (12) and (13) converge to strategies (14) and (15), respectively, as x goes to τ . The equilibrium strategies b * 1 and b * 2 are thus continuous in x and τ .…”

Section: Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Substituting it into (9) and solving for b * 1 gives player 1's equilibrium strategy (14). Substituting the latter back into (28) yields player 2's equilibrium strategy (15).…”

Section: Partmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wars of Conquest and Independence

Hodler

Yektas

2019

JITE

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Wars of conquest and wars of independence are characterized by an asymmetry in the payoff structure: The production of one party constitutes the winner's prize, while the production of the other party is not contested. We present and solve a model of warfare, which nests this asymmetric payoff structure as well as the standard symmetric payoff structure where the winner gets aggregate production. We use this model to discuss how equilibrium behavior and outcomes depend on resource endowments and military and production technologies in asymmetric wars; and to compare equilibrium behavior and outcomes in symmetric and asymmetric wars. Among others, we find that asymmetric wars are fought less intensively, and that defending countries in wars of conquest and secessionist groups in wars of independence have higher winning probabilities in such asymmetric wars than they would have in standard symmetric wars.

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“…The sequential protocol in auctions has been studied, theoretically and experimen-tally, in the context of contests (Fonseca, 2009;Hoffmann and Rota-Graziosi, 2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

et al. 2017

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We study first-and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions generate higher revenue.

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Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models

Cited by 21 publications

References 62 publications

Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests

Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests

Wars of Conquest and Independence

Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

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