Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures

Greenlee, Patrick

doi:10.2139/ssrn.204549

Cited by 20 publications

(32 citation statements)

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“…When spillovers are high, there is little scope for information sharing, but R&D coordination increases R&D. R&D coordination is beneficial if spillovers are high and/or firms share information. Also, combined with the results of Hinloopen (1994) and Greenlee (1998), the model suggests that information sharing is beneficial when spillovers are low (when spillovers are high information sharing is only marginally beneficial) and/or firms coordinate R&D expenditures.…”

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confidence: 76%

“…Yi (1998) studies the stability of cost reducing joint ventures with exogenous cost reduction. Greenlee (1998) Branstetter and Sakakibara (1997) report that in Japan technology leaders are more reluctant to participate in some research consortia. 4 For instance, the research results of SEMATECH (the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium) benefited members as well as non-members of the research consortium (Grindley et al, 1994). 6 sharing in RJVs is imperfect, it remains exogenous.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…22 Our model gives mixed recommendations regarding the regulation of R&D cooperation. Contrarily to RJVs that coordinate R&D expenditures only, which are beneficial only when spillovers are high, and RJVs that share information only, which are beneficial only when spillovers are low (Hinloopen, 1994;Greenlee, 1998), RJVs that coordinate R&D expenditures and (may) share information improve welfare for all levels of spillovers. When spillovers are low, R&D coordination by itself reduces R&D, but this is more than compensated for by the increase in R&D due to information sharing.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

Atallah

2003

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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CIRANOLe CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisationsmembres, d'une subvention d'infrastructure du ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. Reproduction partielle permise avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©. Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the ISSN 1198-8177Ce document est publié dans l'intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners. Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation inResearch Joint Ventures * Gamal Atallah † Résumé / AbstractLe partage d'information et la stabilité de la coopération dans les consortiums de recherche. Cet article examine le partage de technologie et la stabilité de la coopération dans les consortiums de recherche (RJVs) dont le but est la réduction des coûts de production. Dans un jeu à trois étapes, les firmes prennent des décisions quant à leur participation à la RJV, au partage d'information et aux dépenses en R&D, et à leur output. Une caractéristique importante du modèle est que le partage volontaire d'information au sein de la RJV augmente les fuites d'information vers les non-membres. On montre que les RJVs représentant une plus grande proportion des firmes dans l'industrie ont davantage tendance à partager l'information. Lorsqu'il n'en coûte rien de partager l'information, les firmes ne choisissent pas des niveaux intermédiaires de partage d'information: l'information est partagée au complet ou pas du tout. La taille de la RJV dépend de trois effets: un effet de coordination, un effet d'information et un effet de concurrence. Dépendamment de l'importance relative de ces trois effets, la taille de la RJV peut augmenter ou diminuer avec les externalités. Lorsque les fuites d'information vers les non-membres augmentent, les membres de la RJV réduisent leurs dépenses en R&D. De plus, soit qu'ils augmentent la taille de la RJV en maintenant le partage d'information (lorsque les externalités sont faibles), soit qu'ils réduisent la taille de la RJV et le partage d'information (lorsque les externalités sont élevées). L'effet du partage d'information sur la profitabilité des firmes ainsi que sur le bien-être est exami...

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confidence: 76%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

Atallah

2003

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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“…The found patterns may indicate relevant dimensions along which one can further develop the theory-building on the endogenous formation of RJVs (see Greenlee, 2005, for an overview). Additionally, gaining insight into RJV dynamics is important from a policy perspective, as it gives indications about the learning processes that take place -or at least about the opportunities of learning -and therefore about the degree of competitiveness of the participating firms, and ultimately the sources of economic progress.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis

2007

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Abstract:The aim of this paper is to test the determinants of Research Joint Ventures' (RJVs) group dynamics. We look at entry, exit and turbulence in RJVs that have been set up under the US National Cooperative Research Act, which allows for certain antitrust exemptions in order to stimulate firms to cooperate in R&D. Accounting for unobserved project characteristics and controlling for inter-RJV interactions and industry effects, the Tobit panel regressions show the importance of group and time features for an RJV's evolution. We further identify an average RJV's long-term equilibrium size and assess its determining factors. Ours is a first attempt to produce robust stylized facts about cooperational short-and long-term dynamics, an important but neglected dimension in research cooperations.

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“…An exception to the majority of the literature on coordination and spillovers in RJVs is the notion of research sharing joint ventures (RSJVs) in which firms agree to share the results of their research effort, but do not otherwise coordinate efforts (Greenlee, 2005 tied to patent pool formations, suggesting that the analysis of our model may-to a degreecarry over to RSJVs. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, an important distinction between our model of patent pooling and RSJVs is that the pooling decision does not lie in the hands of the firms that undertake the commercialization and then compete in the product market, but rather, it depends on the incentives and interests of the upstream patent holders.…”

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confidence: 98%

Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization

Jeitschko

Zhang²

2014

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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The conventional antitrust wisdom is that the formation of patent pools is welfare enhancing when patents are complementary, since the pool avoids a double-marginalization problem associated with independent licensing. The focus of this paper is on (downstream) product development and commercialization on the basis of perfectly complementary patents. We consider development technologies that entail spillovers between rivals, and assume that final demand products are imperfect substitutes. When pool formation facilitates information sharing and either increases spillovers in development or decreases the degree of product differentiation, patent pools can adversely affect welfare by reducing the incentives towards product development and product market competition-even with perfectly complementary patents. This modifies and even negates the conventional wisdom for some settings and suggests why patent pools are uncommon in science-based industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals, despite there being frequent policy advocacy for them.

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Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures

Cited by 20 publications

References 40 publications

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis

Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization

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