Endogenous deregulation: evidence from OECD countries

Duso, Tomaso; Röller, Lars‐Hendrik

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00155-1

Cited by 61 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Following some recent contributions, which find political variables to determine policy outcomes (Besley & Case, 2000;Duso & Röller, 2003;Duso & Seldeslachts, 2010), we use the government's ideological positions on regulatory issues as possible instruments. 11 Second, in addition to the IV estimation, we adopt a less formal approach to improve our identification strategy, which looks at potential heterogeneous effects of competition policy on TFP growth.…”

Section: A Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The results of these IV estimations are reported in table 4. Following Duso and Röller (2003) and Duso and Seldeslachts (2010), we use political variables related to the government's programmatic position toward competition and regulation as instruments for the policy. Independent of whether we instrument only for the aggregate CPI (columns 1, 3, and 5), or for both the aggregate CPI and PMR indexes (columns 2, 4, and 6), whether we use our preferred aggregate CPI (columns 1 and 2) or the equal-weight one (columns 3 and 4), or whether we use LP growth instead of TFP growth as dependent variable (columns 5 and 6), we always find a positive and significant coefficient estimate for the aggregate CPI.…”

Section: B Instrumental Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment

Buccirossi

Ciari

Duso

et al. 2013

The Review of Economics and Statistics

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158

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Abstract-This paper estimates the impact of competition policy on total factor productivity growth for 22 industries in twelve OECD countries over 1995 to 2005. We find a positive and significant effect of competition policy as measured by created indexes. We provide results based on instrumental variables estimators and heterogeneous effects to support the causal nature of the established link. The effect is particularly strong for specific aspects of competition policy related to its institutional setup and antitrust activities. It is also strengthened by good legal systems, suggesting complementarities between competition policy and the efficiency of law enforcement institutions.

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Section: A Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Instrumental Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment

Buccirossi

Ciari

Duso

et al. 2013

The Review of Economics and Statistics

Self Cite

158

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“…Quinn and Toyoda (2007) show that the emphasis given to the category "Free Enterprise" (per401) explains changes in international capital account regulation. Duso and Röller (2003) and Duso and Seldeslachts (2010) apply manifesto data in research related to industrial economics and find that the emphasis given to the issues "Market Regulation" (per403) and "Welfare state limitation" (per505) are determinants of the entry liberalization, and hence competition, in the digital mobile telephony. Finally, evidence also exists for environmental policies: Knill et al (2010) demonstrate that party preferences for "environmental protection" (per501) and "anti-growth economy" (per416) positively affect the number of adopted environmental policies.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Words speak louder than actions: The impact of politics on economic performance

Osterloh

2012

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10092.pdf Non-technical summaryIn this paper, we present a new approach to disclose the impact of policy preferences of parties on economic growth. We derive policy preferences of parties, such as political ideology and preferences restricted to single policy dimensions, from the content analysis of party manifestos. This data is obtained from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), an international large scale project in political science that has collected the wording of thousands of election manifestos. These are coded according to the frequency of sentences devoted to 56 different policy issues, which comprise economic and non-economic issues and are regarded as proxies for the party preferences in the related political science literature. Based on this data, it is possible to calculate indices for the general left-right position as well as concerning specific policy areas that represent the political preferences of the parties or legislatures.In the empirical section, we analyse per capita GDP growth in a panel of 23 OECD countries for the period 1971-2004. We estimate several models containing a set of typical control variables; fixed effects control for time-invariant country-specific influences. First, we follow an approach which is typical for the empirical political economics literature and employ dummy variables for the differentiation of left-wing and right-wing governments.However, we are not able to detect a significant impact of partisanship on growth rates.This implies that partisanship defined according to the broad distinction between leftwing and right-wing governments cannot be proven to affect economic growth.Then we proceed with analyses based on 7 indices that account for the political preferences concerning different policy areas. These indicators are first tested individually in our empirical model, and then jointly in a model averaging procedure, the weighted averaged least squares (WALS) method. A strong and robust negative impact on economic growth can be detected for parties that support market interventions, whereas a positive impact can be found for parties that aim at setting incentives for business as well as those which promote technology and infrastructure. Welfare state policies are also found to have a significant negative effect in our classical estimations, but show a much weaker impact in our WALS analysis. These results are robust to...

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“…24 Regulation might be endogenous if deregulation tends to occur where productivity growth or innovation are greater and training is correlated with these variables (see e.g. Duso and Röller, 2003). Although we believe that this is unlikely to seriously affect estimates, we partially control for this channel by adding to some of our specifications, as additional covariates, R&D intensity, productivity levels and growth and the investment rate.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%