“…He goes on to argue that any account with this feature is bound to be unsatisfactory in the light of the de Bruijn objection, entailing as it does that the putatively knowledgeable status of the first‐order judgement is compatible with the subject being in a position in which, for all she knows her judgment may be false. As I argue at greater length in my own discussion of McDowell's views (Brewer, ), and recapitulate briefly above, I regard his argument here as incomplete. My own position effectively constitutes a counterexample to it.…”
Section: Response To Mcdowellmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Gupta's () comments on my account of visual similarities and looks focus on a fundamental point of disagreement between us that is also central to my own comments on his position (Brewer, ). In my terminology, this is the relation between a correct theoretical characterization of the ways worldly objects look in perception, on the one hand, and the nature of those very things that are the objects of our acquaintance, on the other.…”
“…He goes on to argue that any account with this feature is bound to be unsatisfactory in the light of the de Bruijn objection, entailing as it does that the putatively knowledgeable status of the first‐order judgement is compatible with the subject being in a position in which, for all she knows her judgment may be false. As I argue at greater length in my own discussion of McDowell's views (Brewer, ), and recapitulate briefly above, I regard his argument here as incomplete. My own position effectively constitutes a counterexample to it.…”
Section: Response To Mcdowellmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Gupta's () comments on my account of visual similarities and looks focus on a fundamental point of disagreement between us that is also central to my own comments on his position (Brewer, ). In my terminology, this is the relation between a correct theoretical characterization of the ways worldly objects look in perception, on the one hand, and the nature of those very things that are the objects of our acquaintance, on the other.…”
“…Brewer thinks that, in “good” cases, phenomenology is constituted by objects and perceptible features presented in experience. And he thinks that this conception is required if phenomenology is to play a determinate rationalizing role (Brewer, : 315). I, however, am unable to accept either of these theses.…”
Section: Brewer On Phenomenologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Brewer spells out what is objectionable thus: the conscious presentation of those specific things rather than any others … cannot be ignored in accounting for the rational contribution of perceptual experience. Yet this seems to me to be a consequence of Gupta's neutral hypothetical conception of perceptual rationality (Brewer, : 312).…”
BREWER ON PHENOMENOLOGY1. It is interesting, though not altogether unsurprising, that the element in my position Brewer finds problematic is the very one that corresponds to the element I objected to in my discussion of his position. I objected to Brewer's treatment of visual similarities. Brewer, in turn, objects to my treatment of phenomenology.Brewer takes me to affirm an "absolute" independence of phenomenology from presentation, and he thinks this entails (in light of the other things I accept) "objectionable consequences." One such consequence, according to Brewer, is that there is no determinate given for experience. Another consequence is what Brewer calls "the neutrality of perceptual rationality." 2. Now, I certainly do not accept the dependence Brewer affirms between phenomenology and presentation. Brewer thinks that, in "good" cases, phenomenology is constituted by objects and perceptible features presented in experience. And he thinks that this conception is required if phenomenology is to play a determinate rationalizing role (Brewer, 2019: 315). I, however, am unable to accept either of these theses.Let us think through the disagreement here with the aid of a simplified version of an example Brewer uses in framing his objections. Imagine that two subjects, X and X*, are shown a yellow cube, o, and thereby undergo visual experiences e y and * respectively. Let us suppose that because of the differences in their perceptual situations, or perhaps because of the differences in their sensory 378 GUPTA 379 constitutions, the presentations of o to X and X* are not subjectively identical in the color dimension. Let be the color phenomenology of e y , and let * (≠ ) be the color phenomenology of * . Let us suppose, finally, that the color phenomenology of * is identical to the color phenomenology of X's perception e r , in good viewing conditions, of a red object. Now, Brewer accepts the transparency of "good" experiences, and he takes the color phenomenology of e r to be constituted by the color quality red. 1 He thinks, therefore, that * is constituted by the quality red, and he thinks that this constitutional dependence is required if phenomenology is to play a determinate rational role. I, for my part, deny both theses. I do not think that there is any constitutional dependence of phenomenology on presentation, and I do not think that the lack of such dependence deprives phenomenology of a rational role in cognition. Unsurprisingly, I also reject the transparency idea that founds Brewer's theses.
3.Brewer and I agree, nonetheless, that there are "visual similarities" (in the color dimension) between X's experience e r and X*'s experience * . Also, we both use the notion of phenomenology to capture the "visual similarities": the two experiences possess the same (color) phenomenology. Furthermore, neither of us wishes to understand phenomenology in the manner of sense-datum theorists: neither of us wishes to explain the possession of color phenomenology in terms of the presence of an appropriately colored...
“…In Brewer's () initial gloss on these cases, the input to such inference is always another experience, and that experience always has a baseline amount of epistemic power. He then asks how this gloss would apply to memory color, where one ends up experiencing a banana as yellowish.…”
REPLY TO BREWERMy inferentialist analysis of hijacked experiences allows that these experiences can be conclusions of inference. If experiences are conclusions of inference in these cases, what kinds of mental states can figure as the inputs to the inferences?In Brewer's (2019) initial gloss on these cases, the input to such inference is always another experience, and that experience always has a baseline amount of epistemic power. He then asks how this gloss would apply to memory color, where one ends up experiencing a banana as yellowish.The answer is that it wouldn't because the gloss is too limited. The inputs to inferences that culminate in experiences can be informational states of the perceptual system as well as cognitive states such as beliefs, suspicions fear (more exactly, its representational component, as well as such components of other emotions). Inferences to experience can occur wholly within the perceptual system. 1 In my analysis of the case of memory color, the ultimate status of the experience depends on the structure of the underlying processing. 2 The conclusion is false, but this fact alone does not worsen the inference. An inference to a false conclusion could be epistemically good. It will be a poor inference, I claim, when information indicating that the banana is grey is not given its due weight, or the prior assumption that bananas are yellow is given too much weight, or both. Here, there is no other experience that figures in the inference. A fortiori there is no positively charged experience that figures as an input to the inference. So premise E1 in Brewer's reconstruction is not part of my analysis. There is no greyish appearance, either in the actual experiments (as they're typically interpreted) or in the cases I discuss. 3 It strikes me as incoherent to say that a single experience at a time both presents the same visible parts of a banana as two different hues at once, greyish and yellowish. If Brewer thinks this may be my view, I wonder why he did not criticize it on these grounds.In line with the mistaken assumption that perceptual inputs are always experiences that retain baseline epistemic power, Brewer takes me to be committed to a "baseline experiential input immune from influence" by prior assumptions, and then says this commitment creates instability. But there is no such commitment. Part of what makes information processing perceptual is that it takes in information from the environment. The importance and interest of the phenomena that motivate the Rationality of Perception thesis stem from the fact that experiences can occur far downstream of such inputs. Phenomenologically, experiences are passive and receptive, but informationally, they can in principle be heavily shaped by one's prior outlook. When that happens, any epistemology of perception that Philosophical Issues. 2019;29:403-410.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phis
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