Empirical Ethics, Context-Sensitivity, and Contextualism

Abstract

In medical ethics, business ethics, and some branches of political philosophy (multi-culturalism, issues of just allocation, and equitable distribution) the literature increasingly combines insights from ethics and the social sciences. Some authors in medical ethics even speak of a new phase in the history of ethics, hailing "empirical ethics" as a logical next step in the development of practical ethics after the turn to "applied ethics." The name empirical ethics is ill-chosen because of its associations with "descriptive ethics." Unlike descriptive ethics, however, empirical ethics aims to be both descriptive and normative. The first question on which I focus is what kind of empirical research is used by empirical ethics and for which purposes. I argue that the ultimate aim of all empirical ethics is to improve the context-sensitivity of ethics. The second question is whether empirical ethics is essentially connected with specific positions in meta-ethics. I show that in some kinds of meta-ethical theories, which I categorize as broad contextualist theories, there is an intrinsic need for connecting normative ethics with empirical social research. But context-sensitivity is a goal that can be aimed for from any meta-ethical position.

What does medical ethics need empirical methods for?

“…Dies behaupten etwa pragmatistische autoren [10] oder Vertreter einer sog. "integrativen empirischen ethik" ([16-18, 25]; dazu auch: [19,20]). Selbst wenn der Pragmatismus jedoch zeigen kann, dass eine dualistische Ontologie unzutreffend ist, bedeutet dies noch nicht, dass die Frage nach gültigen Handlungsnormen und die Frage nach einer zutreffenden beschreibung der Wirklichkeit nicht unterscheidbar sind.…”

Moral tales of parental living kidney donation: a parenthood moral imperative and its relevance for decision making

“…There is a shift within medical ethics from a purely theoretical focus towards different kinds of empirical ethics (Birnbacher 1997, Musschenga 2005, XXX 2005). Empirical ethics 6 Stories with a moral or a point have a long tradition and they are told with a certain purpose; a number of different morals/points can also be identified within a narrative.…”

Mission: Impossible? On Empirical-Normative Collaboration in Ethical Reasoning

“…Since G.E. Moore's considerations on the naturalistic fallacy, Hume's Law is primarily understood by the logical differences between empirical and normative statements: while the logical value of being true or false can be attached to empirical statements, this is not possible for normative statements (Engels 2008;Moore 1993). Therefore, it is said to be logically inadmissible to forthright conclude from statements of 'Is' to statements of 'Ought'.…”