Empathy in Other Apes

Andrews, Kristin; Gruen, Lori

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969470.003.0010

Cited by 14 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…Similarly, for Andrews and Gruen (2014), it is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of morality to show that members of a particular species are at least implicitly sensitive-e.g., via other-directed emotional capacities-to the needs and interests of others.…”

Section: The Core Debate: Merely Terminological?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At most generous end of the spectrum are researchers like Bekoff and Pierce (2009), Rowlands (2012;2017), Musschenga (2013), Andrews and Gruen (2014), and Monsó (2015), all of whom argue that at least a core subset of the psychological capacities that underlie human morality are far from uniquely human, but are rather things that we share with many social animals. Whatever differences may exist between their moral psychologies and moral systems and those of humans-none of these authors deny that there are such differences-should be seen as differences in the extent and sophistication of moral capacity.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Others are much more sceptical about cognitive empathy in animals, largely because of doubts about their mind-reading capacities. Andrews and Gruen (2014; see also Gruen, 2015) provide an account of empathy and its putative connection with morality in apes that tries to carve some space between emotional contagion and full cognitive empathy. Monsó (2015) argues that even emotional contagion can be viewed in moral terms; hence, the debate over animal morality can be fully separated from the debate over animal mind-reading.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…And although each of these capacities may make human morality unique, they are all grounded in a much deeper, broader, and evolutionary more ancient layer of moral behaviours that we share with other animals. (2009, p141) Similarly, Andrews and Gruen (2014) criticize the tendency of philosophers like Korsgaard to focus on "the most rarefied and linguistically mediated" aspects of human moral cognition and behaviour:…”

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confidence: 99%

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Animal morality: What is the debate about?

Fitzpatrick

2017

Biol Philos

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Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social animals have prompted scientists and philosophers to debate the question of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers have argued that morality does exist in several animal species, others that these species may possess various evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article, while some have argued that nothing remotely resembling morality can be found in any non-human species. However, these different positions on animal morality generally appear to be motivated more by different conceptions of how the term "morality" is to be defined than on empirical disagreements about animal social behaviour and psychology. After delving deeper into the goals and methodologies of various of the protagonists, I argue that, despite appearances, there are actually two importantly distinct debates over animal morality going on, corresponding to two quite different ways of thinking about what it is to define "morality", "moral cognition", and associated notions. Several apparent skirmishes in the literature are thus cases of researchers simply talking past each other. I then focus on what I take to be the core debate over animal morality, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural kind. I argue that this debate is in fact largely terminological and non-substantive. Finally, I reflect on how this core debate might best be re-framed. 1.Introduction In recent years, there has been much interest in whether morality exists in some non-human animals (henceforth, "animals"), or, put differently, whether some animals possess a moral psychology: whether they possess the requisite psychological capacities to engage in some form of moral cognition and action-for instance, make judgments of moral approval or disapproval about others' behaviour, internalize and enforce moral rules or norms, and act for moral reasons (e.g., act punitively towards another individual because of a moral evaluation of that individual's behaviour).Such questions have been prompted by a burgeoning empirical literature on the remarkably complex and intricate social lives, particularly of our closest primate 2 relatives, but also of other social mammals like elephants, domestic dogs, wolves, whales, dolphins, and rats, and even some non-mammalian species, such as ravens.For example, chimpanzees appear to engage in third-party policing of behaviour, which seems to indicate the existence and enforcement of norms of conduct within their communities (de Waal, 1996(de Waal, , 2014Rudolf von Rohr, et al., 2012). Special place is typically accorded to infants, for instance, such that aggression towards them is met with loud protests and active intervention on the part of uninvolved bystanders (Rudolf von Rohr, et al., 2011. Many other social mammals also appear to enforce various behavioural norms. For instance, m...

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Section: The Core Debate: Merely Terminological?mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Animal morality: What is the debate about?

Fitzpatrick

2017

Biol Philos

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“…Chimpanzees have norms against infanticide, norms about group territory and ownership of food. The strong protect the weak, as demonstrated in road crossing behaviors (for a discussion of these see Andrews and Gruen ). Chimpanzee infants engage in neonatal imitation as do human infants, suggesting an innate drive to imitate the actions of her in‐group members (Myowa‐Yamakoshi et al ).…”

Section: Social Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Folk Psychological Spiral: Explanation, Regulation, and Language

Andrews¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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In this paper I intend to argue that an explanatory role for folk psychology is also a regulative role, and that language is not required for these regulative functions. I will start by drawing out the relationship between prediction, explanation, and regulation of behavior according to both mindreading approaches to folk psychology and the pluralistic account I defend. I will argue that social cognition does not take the form of causal reasoning so much as it does normative reasoning, and will introduce the folk psychological spiral. Then I will examine the cognitive resources necessary for participating in the folk psychological spiral, and I will argue that these cognitive resources can be had without language. There is preliminary evidence that some other species understand one another through a normative lens that, through looping effects, creates expectations that community members strive to live up to.

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Caring animals and care ethics

Wrage¹

2022

Biol Philos

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Are there nonhuman animals who behave morally? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract its core commitments to what is required for moral care: emotional motivation that enables the intentional meeting of another’s needs, and forward-looking responsibility in particular relationships. What is not required, I argue, are metarepresentational capacities or the ability to scrutinize one’s reasons for action, and thus being retrospectively accountable. This minimal account of moral care is illustrated by moral practices of parental care seen in many nonhuman animal species. In response to the worry that parental care in nonhuman animals lacks all evaluation and is therefore nonmoral I point to cultural differences in human parenting and to normativity in nonhuman animals.

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Empathy in Other Apes

Cited by 14 publications

References 5 publications

Animal morality: What is the debate about?

Animal morality: What is the debate about?

The Folk Psychological Spiral: Explanation, Regulation, and Language

Caring animals and care ethics

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