Caring animals and care ethics

Abstract

Are there nonhuman animals who behave morally? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract its core commitments to what is required for moral care: emotional motivation that enables the intentional meeting of another’s needs, and forward-looking responsibility in particular relationships. What is not required, I argue, are metarepresentational capacities or the ability to scrutinize one’s reasons for action, and thus being retrospectively accountable. This minimal account of moral care is illustrated by moral practices of parental care seen in many nonhuman animal species. In response to the worry that parental care in nonhuman animals lacks all evaluation and is therefore nonmoral I point to cultural differences in human parenting and to normativity in nonhuman animals.

Advancing the 3Rs: innovation, implementation, ethics and society

“…They need to be continuously re-examined with a view to their normative foundations, their interpretation, their implementation, and their innovation. To give just one illustration of change, we are now much more willing to recognize features such as cognitive and emotional capacities, and prosocial behavior, in non-human species, and to accept the moral responsibilities that follow from such recognition (108,(118)(119)(120).…”

“…As far as we know, it is not only pain and suffering that make a difference to an animal's life. Taking, for example, newer research on cognitive abilities in animals into account, phenomena like the desire to care for conspecifics (108), the preference for stimulating and changing environments (where neophile animals are concerned) with exploratory possibilities (109), certain emotional states, and so on, might enrich the debate and have a bearing on our responsibilities as regards refinement (110,111). Again, as in the case of replacement and reduction, thinking through the limitations and possible advances here might broaden the debate and allow 3Rs research in the humanities, legal studies and social sciences to be linked with the public debate, and to reflect the issues addressed in a systematic manner.…”

Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

“…And there is good reason to think care related to collaboration is found widely among animals. In some cases coperative care-giving is foundational for the development of valuable relationships or community-at large for example in the practice of parental care in a wide range of species ( Wrage, 2022 ); alloparenting in social mammals ( Lukas and Clutton-Brock, 2018 ), such as bats ( McCracken and Gustin, 1991 ) and chimpanzees ( Nishida, 1983 ); even birth assitants in chimpanzees ( Hirata et al, 2011 ) and bats ( Kunz et al, 1994 ). Further, if collaboration can be understood to include maintaining valuable relationships, then caring attention in reconciliatory ( Webb, 2012 ) and consoling behavior ( Goldsborough et al, 2020 ; Heesen et al, 2022 ) should also be included.…”