Emission reduction cooperation in a dynamic supply chain with competitive retailers

Wang, Jun; Ma, Rui; Lü, Xin-You; Yu, Baoqin

doi:10.1007/s10668-021-02031-6

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Referring to Cheng and Fan (2021), Meng et al (2022), and Ma, Meng, Li, and Huang (2023), each NEV can obtain credits

italicλk

based on the low‐carbon level

k

, and

λ ((), λ > 0)

is the NEV credit coefficient, then each NEV credit is

italicλk

. Also, we assume that the credit trading price is

g ((), g > 0)

, thus, the manufacturer's credit gain from producing an NEV is

italicλkg

.Assumption To support carbon neutrality goals and improve the low‐carbon performance of NEVs, manufacturers need to invest in green technologies with abatement investment costs of

\frac{1}{2} μ k^{2}

, and

μ ((), μ > 0)

represents the abatement cost coefficient for manufacturers (Kou et al, 2022; Wang et al, 2022; Yang & Chen, 2018). We do not consider retailers to invest in green technologies due to the zero carbon emissions of NEVs in the use phase.Assumption NEV manufacturers and retailers use shareholding ratios to share profits and collaborate to reduce low‐carbon operational costs.…”

Section: Model Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This article develops a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, considers the incentive effect of the dual‐credit policy, proposes three shareholding strategies (manufacturer shareholding, retailer shareholding, and cross‐shareholding), and investigates the optimal decisions of NEV enterprises. Our results indicate that increased credit trading price, manufacturer shareholding ratio, and retailer shareholding ratio all improve NEV low‐carbon levels and manufacturer profits. In contrast, the performance of retailer profits is more complex and requires a lower range of shareholding ratio in most situations to achieve growth. Meanwhile, the cross‐shareholding strategy is the optimal choice for the manufacturer. However, the retailer only sometimes benefits from a cross‐shareholding strategy, and the manufacturer shareholding strategy can lead to the highest retailer profits in most cases. Furthermore, these findings can provide critical managerial insights for automobile enterprises and governments.

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“…Referring to Cheng and Fan (2021), Meng et al (2022), and Ma, Meng, Li, and Huang (2023), each NEV can obtain credits

italicλk

based on the low‐carbon level

k

, and

λ ((), λ > 0)

is the NEV credit coefficient, then each NEV credit is

italicλk

. Also, we assume that the credit trading price is

g ((), g > 0)

, thus, the manufacturer's credit gain from producing an NEV is

italicλkg

.Assumption To support carbon neutrality goals and improve the low‐carbon performance of NEVs, manufacturers need to invest in green technologies with abatement investment costs of

\frac{1}{2} μ k^{2}

, and

μ ((), μ > 0)

Section: Model Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kou et al, 2022;Wang et al, 2022;Yang & Chen, 2018). We do not consider retailers to invest in green technologies due to the zero carbon emissions of NEVs in the use phase.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…To promote cooperation among supply chain members to be implemented in practice, certain scholars deepened cooperation among supply chain members through coordination contracts. Wang et al (2022a) conducted a comparative analysis of the optimal equilibrium decision without cost sharing and with cost sharing, and the results showed that in the cost-sharing scenario, manufacturers' emission reduction levels and supply chain participants' profits were both improved, thus making members reach a consensus on cost-sharing cooperation. Heydari et al (2020) showed that cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts can effectively coordinate supply chains, not only enabling supply chain members to gain more profits but also making the environment cleaner.…”

Section: Carbon Emission Reductions Through Supply Chain Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon emission reductions, pricing and social welfare of three-echelon supply chain considering consumer environmental awareness under carbon tax policy

Zhang

Qin²

2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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With the rapid growth in carbon emissions from transport, reducing these emissions is becoming as important as reducing emissions from production. We took a transporter as a member of the supply chain system and constructed a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, transporter, and retailer. This study applies the Stackelberg game and Nash game to research the optimal carbon emission reductions, pricing, and social welfare when the government imposes a carbon tax on carbon emitters and consumers are environmentally conscious. The four scenarios were designed as follows: 1) non-cooperative decision-making (NN model), in which neither carbon emission reduction cooperation nor pricing cooperation takes place; 2) local-cooperative decision-making Ⅰ (CN model), in which only cooperation in the field of carbon emission reductions takes place; 3) local-cooperative decision-making Ⅱ (NC model), in which cooperation in the field of pricing without cooperation in the area of carbon emission reductions takes place; and 4) overall-cooperative decision-making (CC model), in which both cooperation in the field of carbon emission reductions and cooperation in the area of pricing take place. The results show that economic (as profit of the supply chain system), social (as pricing and social welfare), and environmental benefits (as the optimal carbon emission reductions) for the three-echelon supply chain will improve with the deepening of cooperation among the supply chain members. Carbon tax policies have different impacts on clean and polluting supply chains. High carbon tax can encourage clean supply chain to increase carbon emission reduction, but will lead to the reduction of carbon emission of polluting supply chain. A cross-shareholding contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal state of the overall cooperative decision. Finally, the paper provides suggestions on carbon emission reductions for enterprises and policymaking for the government.

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“…They promoted the cooperation of green supply chain members through the design of contracts to improve supply chain performance. Wang et al (2022), Xu et al (2017), Cao et al (2017) and Zhao et al (2012) studied carbon emission in green supply chain. In addition, scholars studied product pricing in the green supply chain based on the game theory.…”

Section: Green Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They promoted the cooperation of green supply chain members through the design of contracts to improve supply chain performance. Wang et al. (2022), Xu et al.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Product pricing and green decision-making considering consumers' multiple preferences under chain-to-chain competition

Wang

Liu²,

Wen³

et al. 2022

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PurposeIt is necessary to implement green supply chains. But green development needs to be gradual and coexist with ordinary products in the market. This paper aims to study the green and ordinary product pricing and green decision-making under chain-to-chain competition.Design/methodology/approachThis paper considers consumers' multiple preferences and takes two competitive supply chains with asymmetric channels as the research object. Through the construction of the game models involving different competitive situations, this paper studies the pricing, green decision-making and the supply chains' profits, and discusses the impact of consumer green preference, channel preference, green investment and competition on the decision-making and performance. Finally, this paper further studies the impact of the decision structure on the environmental and economic benefits of supply chains.FindingsThe results show that consumer green preference has an incentive effect on the green supply chain and also provides an opportunity for the regular supply chain to increase revenue. Specifically, consumers' preference for green online channels improves the product greenness, but its impact on the green retailer and regular supply chain depends on the green investment cost. Moreover, competition not only fosters product sustainability, but also improves supply chain performance. This paper also points out that the decentralization of the regular supply chain is conducive to the environmental attributes of the green product, while the environment-friendly structure of the green supply chain is different under different conditions. In addition, the profit of a supply chain under centralized decision is not always higher than that under decentralized decision.Originality/valueThe novelty of this paper is that it investigates the pricing of two heterogeneous alternative products and green decision-making for the green product under the competition between two supply chains with asymmetric channels, in which the green supply chain adopts dual channels and the regular supply chain adopts a single retail channel.

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Emission reduction cooperation in a dynamic supply chain with competitive retailers

Cited by 8 publications

References 53 publications

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

Carbon emission reductions, pricing and social welfare of three-echelon supply chain considering consumer environmental awareness under carbon tax policy

Product pricing and green decision-making considering consumers' multiple preferences under chain-to-chain competition

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