Eminent Domain versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperfect Information about Owners’ Valuations

Shavell, Steven

doi:10.1086/596115

Cited by 37 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Shavell () and Kitchens (2014), who also relax the perfect information assumption, derive similar conclusions.…”

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confidence: 71%

“…For example, landowners may purposefully delay negotiations thereby delaying the project's progress, which may pressure a developer to offer more money to speed up negotiations (e.g., Menezes & Pitchford, ; Miceli & Segerson, ; Miceli & Sirmans, ; Swope, Cadigan, & Schmitt, ). Alternatively, a landowner can claim an offer is not high enough (which may or may not be true) in hopes of seeing an outstanding offer raised (Shavell, ; Strange, ). Landowners may also attempt (using the aforementioned methods or alternative ones) to position themselves as the last seller.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, see O'Flaherty, ; Strange, ; Menezes & Pitchford, ; Miceli & Sirmans, ; Miceli & Segerson, , ; Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp, & Swope, , ; Shavell, ; Swope, Wielgus, Schmitt, & Cadigan, ; Swope et al., ; Miceli, ; Collins & Isaac, ; Shupp, Cadigan, Schmitt, & Swope, ; López & Clark, ; Kitchens, ; Kitchens & Roomets, ; Isaac, Kitchens, & Portillo, .…”

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confidence: 99%

“…There is a rich literature on (a) whether compensation should be paid; (b) what the proper compensation would be, and at a more fundamental level; (c) the tension (or trade‐off) between protecting individual property rights, and using eminent domain to ensure the realization of important projects (see Blume, Rubinfeld, & Shapiro, ; Chang, ; Epstein, ; Fleck & Hanssen, ; Kelly, ; Miceli & Segerson, ; Miceli, Segerson, & Sirmans, ; Munch, ; Nosal, ; Riddiough, , and Shavell, ).…”

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confidence: 99%

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The impact of bargaining delays under the threat of eminent domain

Portillo

2017

Journal of Regional Science

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Developers seeking to assemble complementary parcels of land will likely encounter strategic behavior by landowners. Using a property‐level data set from Florida's Department of Transportation covering the period January 2000 to July 2014, I test whether bargaining delays lead to higher final transaction prices. Given the nature of the data, I can compare properties within the same roadway project to estimate the effect of delayed negotiations. My empirical estimates indicate that bargaining delays lead to increased final transaction prices. The magnitude of this effect is approximately 7 percent for the average holdout, however, the effect is nonlinear and diminishes over time.

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“…Shavell () and Kitchens (2014), who also relax the perfect information assumption, derive similar conclusions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 71%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The impact of bargaining delays under the threat of eminent domain

Portillo

2017

Journal of Regional Science

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“…4 Other authors have proposed individually rational land assembly procedures that eliminate strategic misrepresentation of valuations (Grossman et al, 2010). Unfortunately, the logic of Mailath and Postelwaite (1990) implies that these mechanisms do not solve the underlying holdout problem: they lead to no trade with probability 1 in large markets (Shavell, 2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

Concordance among holdouts

Kominers

Weyl

2011

Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

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Holdout problems prevent decentralized aggregation of complementary goods, but the coercion required to overcome holdout may encourage abuse and violate fairness standards. We propose second-best efficiency, abuse-prevention, and fairness criteria for procedures intended to reduce holdout. Our criteria are jointly satisfied by a class of "Concordance" procedures. In these procedures, the prospective buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the group of sellers, and the sellers use an efficient collective choice mechanism to decide as a group whether to accept the buyer's offer. In the case of sale, the buyer's offer is divided among the sellers in a fashion independent of individual sellers' actions. Each seller retains the option to receive, in the event of sale, her share of the offer (without making any additional payments) in exchange for not influencing the collective decision. Our approach is applicable in a range of contexts including land assembly, spectrum aggregation, corporate acquisitions, and patent pool formation.

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The “Public Purpose” That Is Not Inclusive

Yerramilli

2017

India Studies in Business and Economics

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Eminent Domain versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperfect Information about Owners’ Valuations

Cited by 37 publications

References 8 publications

The impact of bargaining delays under the threat of eminent domain

The impact of bargaining delays under the threat of eminent domain

Concordance among holdouts

The “Public Purpose” That Is Not Inclusive

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