The impact of bargaining delays under the threat of eminent domain

Portillo, Javier E.

doi:10.1111/jors.12363

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…2 Holdout has been observed in laboratory experiments by, e.g., Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp, & Swope (2009, Swope, Wielgus, Schmitt & Cadigan (2011), Parente & Winn (2012), Collins & Isaac (2012), Zillante, Schwarz, & Read (2014), Swope, Cadigan & Schmitt (2014) and . Brooks & Lutz (2016) and Portillo (2017) report field data consistent with seller holdout.…”

Section: Experiments Designmentioning

confidence: 65%

Land assembly with taxes, not takings

DeSantis

McCarter

Winn

2018

Applied Economics Letters

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We use a novel tax mechanism-"rejected offer reassessment"in laboratory experiments to discourage seller holdout and facilitate land assembly. Under this mechanism if a landowner rejects a developer's offer his taxable property value is reassessed to be equal to the rejected offer, increasing his taxes. We find that, relative to a control treatment, rejected offer reassessment discourages the magnitude of seller holdout (but not its frequency) and increases the rate of successful land assembly by almost 60%. It also increases the gains from trade by 22.1% relative to the control treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant.

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Section: Experiments Designmentioning

confidence: 65%

Land assembly with taxes, not takings

DeSantis

McCarter

Winn

2018

Applied Economics Letters

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“…A few notable exceptions focus on the outcomes for owners, especially in terms of compensation for forced taking (Portillo 2018;Kitchens 2014;Chang 2010;Munch 1976), and on reactions to eminent domain among legislators (Morriss 2009;Nadler and Diamond 2008) and the public Metcalf 2014;Becher 2014).…”

Section: Distribution Of the Taking Burdens And Benefits Across Polit...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Divide, Weak Property Rights, and Infrastructure Provision: An Empirical Examination of Takings Decisions in Jerusalem

Levine‐Schnur¹

2021

Law Soc. Inq.

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In this article I use a unique hand-coded dataset of all expropriation exercises in Jerusalem over a twenty-five-year period to test the distribution of the expropriation burden across political communities. I identify the ethnoreligious group to which the impacted landowner belongs and the community that would benefit from the decision. I find that Palestinian property constitutes 38 percent of all land taken over the years, while only 10 percent of all land taken has been repurposed for their local community needs. Conversely, Jewish owners have contributed only 4 percent of all land taken while benefiting from 33 percent of the land taken for their community needs. I also find that land not owned by Jews has a higher propensity to be taken for citywide purposes by ten to twenty-three times than Jewish land, depending on the purpose and the type of property rights involved. This sharp gap can be attributed to the political power relations in the city. The case study enables me to test the relationship between weak property rights and infrastructure provision. As property rights are formally recorded and recognized selectively in some but not in all parts of the city, the article provides the first empirical evidence to the effect of weak property rights on the risk of expropriation. I find that the propensity for noncommunity purpose takings of nonformalized land for which Palestinians claim ownership but have no official records to is significantly higher when compared to formalized Palestinian land. This outcome contradicts the conventional wisdom in the literature that weak property rights help explain limited infrastructure development.

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“…As a neighbor of a nail-resident said, it is reasonable for nail-residents to get higher compensation because they sacrifice a lot. Portillo (2018) finds that in negotiation games with relatively equal bargaining power, holding out tends to increase final transaction prices. But in the context of land expropriation in China, where bargaining power is unequal, it is often insufficient to force local governments to pay higher compensation.…”

Section: Nail-house Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Garnering sympathy: moral appeals and land bargaining under autocracy

Lin¹

2021

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Local governments in autocracies typically undercompensate residents for their land and take it through eminent domain, while residents lack effective formal channels for bargaining with them. I find that some residents nonetheless can defend against such predation through extralegal land bargaining. By sending resistance signals to challenge the legitimacy of local governments, publicize their grievances, and garner public sympathy, such residents embarrass governments, make it likely higher-level governments will punish local governments, and spur concessions. Such signals, however, are often costly or unavailable, so only resistant entrepreneurs can send them. I illustrate the argument by treating ‘nail-house resistance’ in China as a resistance signal: by refusing to vacate their houses, engaging in violence or self-burning, or turning to the media, some residents stop land takings or gain compensation. The findings enrich our understanding of the political and moral economy of land bargaining and institutional change in a transitional autocracy.

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The impact of bargaining delays under the threat of eminent domain

Cited by 4 publications

References 54 publications

Land assembly with taxes, not takings

Land assembly with taxes, not takings

Political Divide, Weak Property Rights, and Infrastructure Provision: An Empirical Examination of Takings Decisions in Jerusalem

Garnering sympathy: moral appeals and land bargaining under autocracy

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