We examined whether and how embodied decision biases-related to motor costs (MC) as well as cognitive crosstalk (CC) due to the body state-are influenced by extended deliberation time. Participants performed a tracking task while concurrently making reward-based decisions, with rewards being presented with varying preview time. In Experiment 1 (N = 58), we observed a reduced CC bias with extended preview time. Partially, this was due to participants slightly adapting tracking to serialize it in relation to decision making. However, the influence of MC was only marginal and not subject to anticipatory state adjustments. In Experiment 2 (N = 67), we examined whether participants integrated the immediate state at reward presentation or anticipated state when a decision could be implemented when adapting their tracking and decision behavior. Results were most compatible with the anticipated state being integrated. We conclude that humans anticipate the body state when a decision must be implemented and consider the corresponding motor and cognitive demands when adapting their decision behavior. However, anticipatory state adaptations targeting the influence of MC with extended preview time were absent, suggesting that anticipatory adaptations are starkly limited in low-practice tasks compared to more overlearned behavior like walking.
Public Significance StatementIn various situations, such as playing soccer or shopping, we make decisions while moving. In doing so, our body's position changes relative to the environment. Hence, over time, some choices become easier or harder to reach, for example, when the distance and concomitant energetic efforts change. Past research has demonstrated humans' ability to anticipatorily adapt movements to reach better choices with less effort. We explored whether humans anticipatorily consider both energetic as well as cognitive costs-which are difficult to disentangle in routine actions-when making decisions. Our results indicate that humans consider both energetic and cognitive costs. However, the ability to actively adjust movements and, thus, alter energetic and cognitive costs is limited in novel tasks compared to routine actions like walking. These findings support theories of embodied decision making and emphasize the anticipatory aspect of decision making during movement.