Elites in Competition and the Reorganization of Power: The Case of Brazil

Abstract

This article describes the formation of the traditional elite of Brazil from the colonial period, and the main ruptures affecting the republic during short democratic periods in which changes were observed in the composition of their elite. The most recent change is historically contextualized by the formation of a new elite, in the form of the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, who were never part of the political-military-hereditary lineage of traditional elites. This was the scenario of the 2014 elections and the impeachment that once again broke away from the democratic system. The historical practices of the traditional elite of Brazil showed themselves to be caught in a vicious circle around the coup d'état to return to power, confronting the responses of the new progressive elite that had resulted from elections during the short periods of democracy. A qualitative methodology of bibliographic review is applied for the construction of the conceptual and analytical framework, and the collection of information from the media for recent facts has still been little analyzed with content analysis, and is complemented with two interviews with people who occupied high government posts, both before and during the coup. The results indicate that the new government elite undervalued the process of financial globalization and promoted the strengthening of representatives of international networks and their entry into the decision-making process, where they formed parallel command structures and networks contrary to government decisions and facilitated the rupture of democracy.

Race, Gender, and Social Class Discrimination in Intersection with Political Identification in Rio de Janeiro

“…It is very common in Brazil to see in the communications media that some population groups criticize social measures and policies, arguing that all have the same opportunities, and that results are based upon individual merit, or that policies are oriented by corruption (Gomes, 2019), which are, in general, accompanied by hate speech that denies the existence of or demerits social beneficiaries by accusing them of corruption, as well as the governments that supported the interest of these groups of poor and afro-descendants. Controversies and conflicts in society raise the argument that race inequality is an imported issue that could create or promote a problem that "does not exist" in Brazilian society, that poor people must work more, that women's behavior causes their own rapes, and so on.…”

“…and almost all the Brazilian presidents were accused of corruption by the communications media, the main alleged reason for almost all of them being historically separated from the power by the Congress and the Judiciary before finishing their mandates due to the ability of the media to accuse them without a chance of defending themselves (Gomes, 2019). There is a historical and legitimized perception planted in the collective subconscious that the State, politicians, social policies, and most Brazilians are naturally corrupt.…”

“…problems which do not exist and that affirmative policies are not necessary and would generate unfair discrimination against white people(Gomes, 2019).Only after the emergence of the massive movement Black Lives Matters in the United States in 2013, have denunciations regarding aggressions and assassinations of afro-descendants been more visible in the Brazilian communication media, despite the fact the cases in Brazil are more scandalous. The most internationally known example was the murder of the activist and municipal councilor, Marielle Franco, in Rio de Janeiro.…”