Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India

Thachil, Tariq

doi:10.1017/s0003055414000069

Cited by 124 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 49 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Third, given the widespread discourse around government's failure to provide basic services, we assume that frustrations towards lack of services will be directed at the government, and it would not follow from conventional theory that those who managed to attain services on their own would systematically punish the government for this state of affairs. Finally, with respect to the South African case, we are not aware of any evidence of rival parties seeking to attract voters by targeting them with the private provision of local public goods in the manner Thachil (2014) finds in the case of India.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 91%

Nuanced Accountability: Voter Responses to Service Delivery in Southern Africa

Kadt¹,

Lieberman²

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Various theories of democratic governance posit that citizens should vote for incumbent politicians when they provide good service, and vote for the opposition when service delivery is poor. But does electoral accountability work as theorized, especially in developing country contexts? Studying Southern African democracies, where infrastructural investment in basic services has expanded widely but not universally, we contribute a new empirical answer to this question. Analyzing the relationship between service provision and voting, we find a surprising negative relationship: improvements in service provision predict decreases in support for dominant party incumbents. Though stronger in areas where opposition parties control local government, the negative relationship persists even in those areas where local government is run by the nationally dominant party. Survey data provide suggestive evidence that citizen concerns about corruption and ratcheting preferences for service delivery may be driving citizen attitudes and behaviors. Voters may thus be responsive to service delivery, but perhaps in ways that are more nuanced than extant theories previously recognized.

show abstract

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 91%

Nuanced Accountability: Voter Responses to Service Delivery in Southern Africa

Kadt¹,

Lieberman²

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This finding echoes that of Hooper and Ortolano (), who found that individuals more strongly identifying with their current also neighbourhood contributed more substantially to collective service upgrading efforts. Moreover, households who were satisfied with the BVM effort were less likely to also use their vote in local elections to voice their concerns regarding WASH conditions, perhaps suggesting that residents are likely to place faith in political channels or non‐communal neighbourhood efforts, but not both, as some recent evidence from India suggests (Thachil, ). Evidence for the complementarity of individual and collective strategies, however, is weaker.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, there are less readily observable collective mechanisms to secure basic services, such as those offered by unofficial political organizations operating at the ground level, which are not assessed in this study (Thachil, 2014). collective action to be effective appear to trade off this engagement with the employment of other EVL strategies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Standalone, Collective or Both? How Low-income Urban Households Employ Strategies to Secure Basic Service Access in Hyderabad, India

Pierce

2017

J. Int. Dev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Basic service security remains grossly insufficient for many urban slum households in low‐income and middle‐income countries. While participation in collective action has often been hailed as the most effective means to secure improvements, households also employ standalone strategies to enhance service provision. Yet potential trade‐offs or complementarities between individual and collective strategies have rarely been considered. Using data from a survey of 752 households in the core urban area of Hyderabad, India, this study uses both the exit, voice and loyalty and collective action frameworks to jointly consider household participation in standalone and groups efforts to improve basic service security. Findings show that, contrary to most past conceptualizations, households employ several strategies simultaneously. While there is some evidence of substitution in strategies employed by households, there appears to be little strategic complementarity. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

“…Brokers are essential for parties that lack direct linkages to voters. Local notables can lend their credibility with a relatively small constituency and procure votes for parties that cannot reach out to that group of individuals in any other way (Keefer and Vlaicu ; Thachil ). Especially in clientelistic mobilization, the contingent exchange of goods for votes, brokers operate by certifying that the goods parties send to voters actually generate political support (Stokes et al.…”

Section: Brokers: An Unreliable Channel To Votersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

Novaes

2017

American J Political Sci

116

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

). In such cases, parties can depend on community organizers, ethnic chiefs, local bureaucrats, neighborhood leaders, patrons, caciques, local politicians, and other notables to act as brokers and close the gulf between party politicians and voters.Brokers, however, can be disloyal, acting more as free agents in a market with a bloc of voters to "sell" than as committed activists. From the perspective of the party, these brokers are useful because they control a private constituency or a module of nonpartisan voters who can readily help party candidates win elections. However, when multiple parties need brokerage to win elections, only the one offering the most attractive incentive package will gain the support of a broker. Since parties' relative ability to hire brokers may fluctuate over time, ongoing brokerage deals may suddenly break apart as brokers receive counteroffers and decide to place their modules elsewhere. Hence, these modular parties need brokers to mobilize voters, but broker disloyalty makes them fragile.This article identifies how brokers' disloyalty affects the organization and the electoral performance of political parties through an empirical analysis of Brazil. The research design in this article takes advantage of the fact that Brazilian parties use local politicians, especially mayoral candidates, as agents for their congressional candidates, making the measurement of broker affiliation less elusive. In addition, the article employs an empirical strategy that counters the endogeneity problem that weak electoral support stimulates disloyalty, or in the case of mayoral candidates, party switching (Desposato 2006). In 2007, a Supreme Court decision greatly inhibited party switching. This decision by an independent actor increased exit costs for those brokers who had won mayoral elections and would then have to ponder whether party switching was worth losing the mayoral seat. Thus, the court increased the survival odds of some party-broker relations.

show abstract

Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India

Cited by 124 publications

References 49 publications

Nuanced Accountability: Voter Responses to Service Delivery in Southern Africa

Nuanced Accountability: Voter Responses to Service Delivery in Southern Africa

Standalone, Collective or Both? How Low-income Urban Households Employ Strategies to Secure Basic Service Access in Hyderabad, India

Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About