Electronic Distribution of Airplane Software and the Impact of Information Security on Airplane Safety

Abstract

The general trend towards ubiquitous networking has reached the realm of airplanes. E-enabled airplanes with wired and wireless network interfaces offer a wide spectrum of network applications, in particular electronic distribution of software (EDS), and onboard collection and off-board retrieval of airplane health reports. On the other hand, airplane safety may be heavily dependent on the security of data transported in these applications. The FAA mandates safety regulations and policies for the design and development of airplane software to ensure continued airworthiness. However, data networks have well known security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers to corrupt and/or inhibit the transmission of airplane assets, i.e. software and airplane generated data. The aviation community has recognized the need to address these security threats. This paper explores the role of information security in emerging information technology (IT) infrastructure for distribution of safety-critical and businesscritical airplane software and data. We present our threat analysis with related security objectives and state functional and assurance requirements necessary to achieve the objectives, in the spirit of the well-established Common Criteria (CC) for IT security evaluation. The investigation leverages our involvement with FAA standardization efforts. We present security properties of a generic system for electronic distribution of airplane software, and show how the presence of those security properties enhances airplane safety.

A Framework for Securing Future eEnabled Aircraft Navigation and Surveillance

“…A framework based on the Common Criteria standard methodology has been establish to specify requirements for protecting the distribution of loadable software and data between aircraft and airline ground systems as well as end-to-end distribution between aircraft and software suppliers against threats to airworthiness and airline business. 4 Secure integration of emerging wireless technologies with the e-enabled aircraft are also being considered, such as use of onboard wireless sensor networks and RFID tags for aircraft health management. 7,14,15 Further, the anticipated impact of the use of security solutions on the commercial aviation information systems and processes are being identified.…”

“…One, the maximum assurance level of commercially available PKI is currently limited to medium assurance levels, hence requiring the design and implementation of a PKI at that level. 4 Two, high assurance evaluation requires consideration for the use of complex analytical tools which can be time consuming and expensive, giving rise to challenges from cost constraints. …”

Secure Operation, Control, and Maintenance of Future E-Enabled Airplanes

“…For instance, next-generation commercial airplanes have wireless access points for receiving loadable software [10], [11] and passive RFID tags for storing maintenance data [8], [16]. Other examples in commercial aviation include the introduction of 1090 MHz Extended Squitter data links for A2A/A2I [26] and broadband networked commercial unmanned aircraft systems [12].…”

Towards Trustworthy Cryptographic Protection of Airplane Information Assets

“…Attacks on an aircraft's critical assets can give rise to safety concerns, e.g., tampering loadable software assessed at the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-178B safety levels A-D 7 can potentially degrade airplane airworthiness as well as present airline business threats, e.g., engineering a late detection of asset corruption or false alarm detection can create unwarranted flight delays and costs. 4,14,15 Digital signatures offers a solution approach for protecting the integrity and authenticity of aircraft assets. 4 A signed asset from a source (signer) to a destination (verifier) in the AIS can be informally described as: asset, sign signer (H(asset), timestamp), cert signer .…”

“…4,14,15 Digital signatures offers a solution approach for protecting the integrity and authenticity of aircraft assets. 4 A signed asset from a source (signer) to a destination (verifier) in the AIS can be informally described as: asset, sign signer (H(asset), timestamp), cert signer . sign x (.)…”