A Framework for Securing Future eEnabled Aircraft Navigation and Surveillance

Abstract

Current air traffic management systems suffer from poor radar coverage and a highly centralized architecture which can under heavy traffic loads overwhelm Air Traffic Control (ATC) centers. Such limitations can lead to inefficient use of the available airspace capacity and insecure scenarios such as low-visibility landings. Future air transportation systems with e-enabled aircraft and networked technologies, such as Automated Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), are cyber-physical systems that promise to help reduce traffic congestion and ATC inefficiencies by enabling exchange of precise surveillance data in shared airspace. This paper focuses on cyber security concerns with highly accurate surveillance of aircraft navigating in a future shared space. A framework is proposed to protect traffic data for both ground and airborne surveillance of aircraft. The framework identifies major threats and vulnerabilities from cyber exploits, specifies security requirements and mitigation solutions. Major security challenges anticipated in supporting networked infrastructure are given along with some open problems.

A New ADS-B Authentication Framework Based on Efficient Hierarchical Identity-Based Signature with Batch Verification

“…Non-cryptographic methods include multilateration [13], [21], distance bounding [21], Kalman filtering [21], data fusion [21] and the lightweight location verification proposed by Strohmeier et al [22]. In terms of cryptographic solutions, some efforts have been made to provide the integrity and authenticity of ADS-B messages in the literature [2], [3], [8], [12], [18], [19]. They either proposed to use symmetric key based authentication methods like MAC or suggested employ asymmetric key based authentication solutions like digital signatures.…”

On Perception and Reality in Wireless Air Traffic Communication Security

“…We focus on three systems: ATC radar, showing the air traffic picture to ground controllers, (Questions 1,3,5,7), TCAS screens displaying intruders in an aircraft's immediate airspace to the pilot (Q2,4,6,8), and navigation aids (Q9). In terms of attack classes, we analyze message injection (Q1-2), content manipulation (Q3- 4,9), selective jamming (Q5-6), and full DoS caused by jamming (Q7-8). We report the answers of 92 pilots to the scenarios relating to their expertise (Q2, 4,6,8,9), and of 31 controllers to the scenarios relevant to ATC (Q1,3,5,7).…”

“…There is much existing work in the wider area of aviation cyber security; in Section VI we survey those articles that relate to the wireless communications technologies on which we focus in the present work. For an introduction to the topic, the reader is referred to Sampigethaya et al, who focus on future "e-enabled" aircraft communications and their security [9] and highlight the challenges and problems of these modern cyberphysical systems [15]. Likewise, [16] surveyed the security of future on-board and off-board avionics systems, relating not only to wireless ATC communication but to the electronic distribution of software and air health management.…”

Lightweight Location Verification in Air Traffic Surveillance Networks

“…Several works have suggested Kalman filters for aircraft intent verification to detect obvious discontinuities in transmitted ADS-B data [22,29]. However, this is mostly an approach to detect less sophisticated attackers injecting unrealistic flight data and would not protect against even a simple replay attack for example, or a valid-looking trajectory change (known as frog-boiling attack [30]).…”