On Perception and Reality in Wireless Air Traffic Communication Security

Abstract

More than a dozen wireless technologies are used by air traffic communication systems during different flight phases. From a conceptual perspective, all of them are insecure as security was never part of their design. Recent contributions from academic and hacking communities have exploited this inherent vulnerability to demonstrate attacks on some of these technologies. However, not all of these contributions have resonated widely within aviation circles. At the same time, the security community lacks certain aviation domain knowledge, preventing aviation authorities from giving credence to their findings.In this survey, we aim to reconcile the view of the security community and the perspective of aviation professionals concerning the safety of air traffic communication technologies. To achieve this, we first provide a systematization of the applications of wireless technologies upon which civil aviation relies. Based on these applications, we comprehensively analyze vulnerabilities and existing attacks. We further survey the existing research on countermeasures and categorize it into approaches that are applicable in the short term and research of secure new technologies deployable in the long term.Since not all of the required aviation knowledge is codified in academic publications, we additionally examine existing aviation standards and survey 242 international aviation experts. Besides their domain knowledge, we also analyze the awareness of members of the aviation community concerning the security of wireless systems and collect their expert opinions on the potential impact of concrete attack scenarios using these technologies.

Cyber Threat Impact Analysis to Air Traffic Flows Through Dynamic Queue Networks

“…There have been many previous efforts exploring both the cybersecurity vulnerabilities within ATC system, along with work exploring the vulnerability of ATC sectors and flows to traditional disruptions (e.g., weather). Key efforts that explored the cybersecurity of air traffic control include work by Strohmeier [24,26] which introduces a survey of the communication devices used in ATC and identifies vulnerabilities for each device. Further work in [4], explores cyber vulnerabilities within the NEXTGEN platform, specifically the ADS-B communications and then explores potential threat impacts based on the aircraft locations and attacker goals.…”

A practical example for validation of ATM security prototypes

“…Air-ground voice communication was recently described again to be one of the most endangered communication means for spoofing and/or spamming [11]. In particular, the SACom aims at improving the security of air-ground voice communication between pilots and air traffic control.…”

Security requirements for SATCOM datalink systems for future air traffic management

“…Anyone can listen in on current ATC voice communication with the help of equipment easy to access. It is also relatively easy to record and decode unencrypted air-ground data transmissions [21], [22], [24]. In voice based ATC no attempt has been made to keep the communications confidential and neither is there any intent to make the existing ATC datalink confidential [7], [31].…”

“…Even though the security threat picture in future ATM is severe, some mitigating factors already exist [24]. Safety has always been the primary concern of the aviation community and many of the safety mechanisms that are in place in today's aircraft and ground systems will also reduce the risks of security incidents.…”