EUROCON 2005 - The International Conference on "Computer as a Tool" 2005
DOI: 10.1109/eurcon.2005.1630348
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Electromagnetic Analysis Attack on an FPGA Implementation of an Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem

Abstract: This paper presents simple (SEMA) and differential (DEMA) electromagnetic analysis attacks on an FPGA implementation of an elliptic curve processor. Elliptic curve cryptography is a public key cryptosystem that is becoming increasingly popular. Implementations of cryptographic algorithms should not only be fast, compact and power efficient, but they should also resist side channel attacks. One of the side channels is the electromagnetic radiation out of an integrated circuit. Hence it is very important to asse… Show more

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Cited by 70 publications
(27 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
(9 reference statements)
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“…On the other hand, typical forms of non-invasive attacks are side-channel attacks, which infer the secret information from the side-channel information generated while the data is being processed. The side-channel information commonly exploited are computation time [28], consumed power [29] and emitted electromagnetic radiation [30].…”
Section: Common Attacks To Fpga Based Ipsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, typical forms of non-invasive attacks are side-channel attacks, which infer the secret information from the side-channel information generated while the data is being processed. The side-channel information commonly exploited are computation time [28], consumed power [29] and emitted electromagnetic radiation [30].…”
Section: Common Attacks To Fpga Based Ipsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unlike other embedded systems, we propose a system that will not store any sensitive information in the device; rather, flash memory is used to store the graphical password image chosen by the user and a unique set of true random numbers generated at the time of production. Since no sensitive information is stored in the device, there is no need for expensive hardware to guard against sidechannel attacks and other hardware cryptanalysis schemes [7][8][9]. Therefore, the graphical password must be used with the device every time an AES key or text password is needed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The use of Montgomery Scalar Multiplication computes point addition and doubling each time without depending on the value of each bit of scalar K. Therefore, it is secure against SPA attacks. For SEMA, though in [28] the authors indicated that this can also resist SEMA, we think it is too early to conclude that since in [17] the capability of multi-channel EMA attacks has not been comprehensively investigated. DPA/DEMA attacks [16,17] use statistical models to analyze multiple measurements.…”
Section: Security Analysis Of the Proposed Unified Countermeasurementioning
confidence: 99%