Electoral System Change in the Netherlands: The Road From Pr to Pr (1917‐2006)

Kolk, Hendrik van der

doi:10.1080/00344890701574914

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In the same vein, in The Netherlands the small right-wing party D66 was at the helm of many proposals for reducing the inclusiveness of the extremely proportional list PR electoral system used to elect the national parliament, this as a way of renewing the political class and of implementing policies of economic liberalization. The position of the party cannot be explained by anticipating the mechanical and psychological effect of the new electoral system, since all the proposals on the table seriously threatened their parliamentary representation (Van der Kolk, 2007). Values are therefore essential in our understanding the puzzle of electoral reform.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral reform, values and party self-interest

Bol

2013

Party Politics

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It is often taken for granted that parties support electoral reform because they anticipate seat payoffs from the psychological and mechanical effects of the new electoral system. Although some studies point out that elements related to values and the willingness to achieve social goals are also relevant to explaining party preference in those situations, a general model of how these considerations influence support for electoral reform is still missing. To fill this gap, I develop in this article a policy-seeking model accounting for values-related factors and operationalize it using one of the most firmly established effects of electoral systems in the literature: The degree of inclusiveness and its consequences for the representation of social groups in parliament. The empirical relevance of this model is then tested using an original dataset reporting the actual position of 115 parties facing 22 electoral reform proposals in OECD countries since 1961. The results show that willingness to favour the electoral system most in line with a party’s electoral platform has a unique explanatory power over party support for a more proportional electoral system. In turn, values appear to be as crucial as party self-interest in explaining the overall electoral reform story.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral reform, values and party self-interest

Bol

2013

Party Politics

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“…Another way to distinguish minor from major reform is to look at the consequences of reform, or at the number of people the reform in question affects (van der Kolk 2007). A point of debate is whether the realm of electoral reform should be extended to, for example, changes in intra-party processes such as candidate selection procedures (Hazan and Rahat 2010) and/or changes in party finance structures (Austin and Tjernstrom 2003).…”

Section: What Is Electoral Reform?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reconceptualising Electoral Reform

Leyenaar¹,

Hazan²

2011

West European Politics

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“…The choice of the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system actually resembles the process seen in new democracies, rather than simply mirroring Westminster. Ultimately, we argue that, as at the statewide level, explanations for other examples of electoral reform at the sub-state level need also to consider the range of pressures on political elites (Rahat 2004; Renwick 2010; Van der Kolk 2007).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Ultimately, we argue that, as at the statewide level, explanations for other examples of electoral reform at the sub-state level need also to consider the range of pressures on political elites (Rahat 2004;Van der Kolk 2007;Renwick 2010). …”

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confidence: 99%

Rational Choice Meets the New Politics: Choosing the Scottish Parliament’s Electoral System

Convery

Lundberg

2018

Gov. & oppos.

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Although there has been extensive research on electoral system choice at the national level, we know relatively little about the dynamics of deciding the rules of the game for sub-state institutions. This article examines the factors that influenced the choice of a proportional electoral system for the new Scottish Parliament in 1999. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with key participants, we challenge the conventional rational choice explanation for the adoption of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Although rational considerations on the part of the Labour Party were involved in the choice of MMP, our findings suggest that, as at the national level, theories of electoral system choice need to consider normative values as well. Keywords: electoral systems, rational choice, Scottish Parliament, MMP, devolutionThe choice of electoral system is one of the most important decisions faced by the actors involved in the creation of new political institutions. In the words of Giovanni Sartori (1968: 273), the electoral system is 'the most specific manipulative instrument of politics'. Some scholars suggest that such choices on electoral systems may be influenced by rational choice considerations, where parties seek to maximize seat gains or minimize potential losses (Benoit 2004), or wider interactions with civil society and the general public (Renwick 2010). However, while there has been extensive research on electoral system change at the national level (Rahat 2011), less attention has been paid to choices in sub-state regions. As Monique Leyenaar and Reuven Hazan (2011: 441) The article begins by reviewing the literature on electoral system choice. We use this to construct an analytical framework based on two broad perspectives: rational choice and an ideological commitment to 'new politics'. We then examine the evidence about the process of choosing the Scottish Parliament's electoral system in light of these perspectives. Finally, we consider the implications of this case study for the wider study of electoral system choice. 4Theoretical approaches to electoral system change Much of the scholarly literature on institutional change (or the lack thereof) assumes that rational political actors try to maximize their utility -often votes or seats.According to the rational choice perspective, parties with a lot of electoral support prefer majoritarian electoral systems and small constituencies, while parties with less support prefer PR, ideally in large constituencies -as Josep Colomer (2005: 2) 6Another constraint on rational action is whether the system change that is proposed by elites is actually perceived as legitimate by the wider public. Matthew Shugart (2008: 10) argues that 'it is precisely at the intersection of normative critiques of the existing rules and rational interest of political actors that reform is most likely to occur', with political actors seeing electoral reform as a selling point. While much of the current research into electoral system choice focuses on recent ...

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Electoral System Change in the Netherlands: The Road From Pr to Pr (1917‐2006)

Cited by 10 publications

References 8 publications

Electoral reform, values and party self-interest

Electoral reform, values and party self-interest

Reconceptualising Electoral Reform

Rational Choice Meets the New Politics: Choosing the Scottish Parliament’s Electoral System

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