Electoral reform, values and party self-interest

Abstract

It is often taken for granted that parties support electoral reform because they anticipate seat payoffs from the psychological and mechanical effects of the new electoral system. Although some studies point out that elements related to values and the willingness to achieve social goals are also relevant to explaining party preference in those situations, a general model of how these considerations influence support for electoral reform is still missing. To fill this gap, I develop in this article a policy-seeking model accounting for values-related factors and operationalize it using one of the most firmly established effects of electoral systems in the literature: The degree of inclusiveness and its consequences for the representation of social groups in parliament. The empirical relevance of this model is then tested using an original dataset reporting the actual position of 115 parties facing 22 electoral reform proposals in OECD countries since 1961. The results show that willingness to favour the electoral system most in line with a party’s electoral platform has a unique explanatory power over party support for a more proportional electoral system. In turn, values appear to be as crucial as party self-interest in explaining the overall electoral reform story.

Is It Interests, Ideas or Institutions? Explaining Elected Representatives' Positions Toward Democratic Innovations in 15 European Countries

“…On the one hand, left-wing MPs are expected to be more positive toward democratic reform that contributes to an inclusive and egalitarian society. On the other hand, right-wing MPs, especially those who support a more conservative notion of maintaining the current institutional arrangements and social order will most likely oppose democratic reform of any kind (Bowler et al, 2002;Bol, 2016;Núñez et al, 2016). Hence, we assume that: H1: Self-identified left-wing representatives are more supportive of democratic innovations compared to self-identified rightwing representatives…”

Choosing an Electoral Rule: Values and Self-Interest in the Lab

“…2 Some studies suggest that both politicians and citizens have a value-driven preference, that is one for the rule that is believed to be best for society or the common good. Using comparative data from established democracies, Bol (2016), for instance, finds that parties that are more favourable to the democratic inclusion of minorities and underrepresented social groups in their electoral manifesto are also more supportive of proportional rules. Bowler, Donovan, and Karp (2006), who analyse a survey with parliamentarians from a selected group of democracies, find that politicians who are the most left-wing are more supportive of reforms, regardless of their direction.…”

¿Qué sistemas electorales prefieren los partidos? El caso de los parlamentos regionales en España (1977-1983)

“…Las concepciones del interés público, el control de los gobiernos o los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas determinan también los procesos instituyentes. Por ejemplo, el comportamiento de los partidos ante la reforma electoral obedece en parte a los valores sobre el buen gobierno, el pluralismo, la representatividad de los grupos sociales e incluso la ideología (Bol, 2016). Como ha subrayado Katz (2005), los partidos gubernamentales, quienes están beneficiados por los sistemas electorales, no pueden asegurar que se mantengan inalterados.…”