Electoral Reform Under Limited Party Competition: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Latin America

Abstract

The adoption of proportional representation in Western Europe has been portrayed as either a defensive or an offensive competition strategy used by established parties to deal with the rise of new parties under majoritarian electoral rules. Neither explanation accounts for PR reform in other regions of the world, where the change took place in the absence of increased party competition. Analyzing the history of electoral reform in Latin America, this article argues that in a context of limited party competition, the initial adoption of PR was part of a strategy of controlled political liberalization promoted by authoritarian rulers. Subdividing this general reasoning, the article shows that PR reform followed different paths depending on the nature of the authoritarian regime and the events that called into question the existing majoritarian electoral system. This argument is supported with a comparative historical analysis of cases within and across each route to reform.

The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies

“…Before concluding, it is important to highlight the limitations of this study and implications for future research. First, while this article uses natural resources as a proxy to measure dictators' capacity to induce compliance, it is worth noting that dictators' strengths can stem from various other sources as well, such as the types of legitimacy (Negretto and Visconti 2018). To be sure, our analytical focus echoes the notion of incumbent capacity advanced by Levitsky and Way (2010).…”

“…Jennifer Gandhi and Abigail Heller (2018) offer useful information about elections and electoral rules in authoritarian regimes during the post Second World War period. Finally, Gabriel Negretto and Giancarlo Visconti (2018) argue that autocrats in Latin America use PR as a tool to either facilitate intra-party competition, or increase regime support, or weaken the majority party during the course of political liberalization.…”

Un reformador del mundo: la representación proporcional en la correspondencia de John Stuart Mill (1859-1873)

“…Comenzando por Bélgica en 1899, prácticamente toda Europa Occidental acompañó la ampliación del sufragio con la adopción de sistemas electorales proporcionales durante Revista de Estudios Políticos, 193, julio/septiembre (2021), pp. 317-337 las dos primeras décadas del siglo xx (Negretto y Visconti, 2018). De hecho, los estudios revelan que los sistemas electorales creados o reformados durante la primera mitad del siglo pertenecen a la familia proporcional (Calvo, 2009).…”

How electoral designers fail: The contextual straightjackets of reform

“…As such, who chooses electoral systems, how long they last, and why they are replaced, are central concerns. Accordingly, researcher has placed both electoral system design (Boix 1999;Negretto and Visconti 2018) and electoral system reform (Renwick 2010;Bowler and Donovan 2013) at center stage.…”