The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies

Chang, Eric C.; Higashijima, Masaaki

doi:10.1017/gov.2021.17

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 47 publications

(59 reference statements)

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“…It should be noted that the choice of electoral systems are also influenced by economic and income inequality factors. A change of the electoral system can occur as a threat of opposition from the electorate (Boix 1999;Chang and Higashijima 2021), implying a two-way causal link between the choice of electoral systems and levels of income inequality and redistribution. 4 Generally, pre-tax income inequality can be less visible to the electorate, implying a weaker link between income inequality and change of electoral systems than in the case of post-tax income inequality.…”

Section: Proportionality Of Parliaments and Income Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral systems and income inequality: a tale of political equality

Zuazu

2021

Empir Econ

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The link between democracy and within-country income inequality remains an unresolved quest in the literature of political economy. To look into this debate, I propose exploring the implications of electoral systems, rather than political regimes, on income inequality. I surmise that proportional representation systems should be associated with lower income inequality than majoritarian or mixed systems. Further, I conjecture that the relationship between electoral systems and income inequality hinges on the de facto distribution of real political power, namely political equality. I use data on 85 countries covering the period 1960–2016 and specify models able to capture the persistence and mean reversion of income inequality. The estimates fail to significantly associate democracy with income inequality, and find other political institutions to significantly shape income inequality. The paper finds a robust association between more proportional systems and lower income inequality. However, this association depends on political equality. Changes towards proportional representation systems seem to lower income inequality at low and medium levels of political equality. Strikingly, instrumental variable estimates show that changes in electoral systems in political equal societies increases income inequality.

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Section: Proportionality Of Parliaments and Income Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral systems and income inequality: a tale of political equality

Zuazu

2021

Empir Econ

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“…Controlling for it, however, does not change the effects of the other variables of interest. Second, other research posits that dictators choose electoral systems depending on their own strength, which may also need to be accounted for here (Chang and Higashijima 2023). In Tables A23 and A24 in the Appendix, I factor in three different electoral systems (proportional, mixed, and majoritarian) but the baseline results are also confirmed here.…”

Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption, Elite Contestation, and Parliaments: Why Do Legislatures Become Stronger in Authoritarian Regimes?

Wiebrecht

2023

Political Research Quarterly

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A growing body of literature studies the personalization of power in authoritarian regimes. Yet, how institutions can become a credible constraint to dictatorial rule is less widely studied. I theorize that corruption is a key factor associated with stronger legislatures in authoritarian regimes. By engaging in corruption, authoritarian elites in ruling coalitions can build up networks of support and influence and ultimately, use their elevated position to impel more legislative powers vis-à-vis the executive. Examining panel data on the strength of legislatures in authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2010, I show empirically that authoritarian parliaments are stronger when levels of corruption in a given regime are high. The link between corruption and legislative strength is especially strong in the Middle East and Africa, and primarily applies to party-based and military dictatorships. More competitive electoral and legislative processes, however, do not uniformly affect parliaments’ strength. These findings contribute to our understanding of institutional changes in autocracies and highlight the centrality of elite contestations in determining institutional trajectories.

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“…Recent research also suggests that decisions about the institutional features of the electoral system follow rational considerations and reflect the different capacities of autocratic rulers. ‘Resource-rich dictators are incentivized to employ proportional representation systems to alleviate the threat from the masses and pre-empt the emergence of new opposition, while resource-poor dictators tend to choose majoritarian systems to co-opt ruling elites in the legislature’ (Chang and Higashijima 2021).…”

Section: Party-based Opposition In Competitive Autocraciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Oppositions in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes: A State-of-the-Field(s) Review

Helms

2022

Gov. & oppos.

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Political opposition has long been one of the most dramatically understudied elements of real-world politics in contemporary democratic and authoritarian regimes. The past decade or so has, however, witnessed an upsurge of new opposition research that begs for a major state-of-the-field review. Interestingly, recent scholarship has focused more on manifestations of opposition in authoritarian and hybrid than in democratic systems, which indicates a latent reconceptualization of political opposition (setting aside older distinctions between regime-loyal opposition and regime-challenging forms of resistance, dissidence and contestation). With a focus on party-based forms of opposition, which have been widely considered to mark the most effective form of opposition, this review article takes stock and highlights key issues for future research as well as some inherent obstacles to the emergence of a more integrated field of cross-regime opposition studies.

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The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies

Cited by 9 publications

References 47 publications

Electoral systems and income inequality: a tale of political equality

Electoral systems and income inequality: a tale of political equality

Corruption, Elite Contestation, and Parliaments: Why Do Legislatures Become Stronger in Authoritarian Regimes?

Political Oppositions in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes: A State-of-the-Field(s) Review

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