Electoral authoritarianism and weak states in Africa: The role of parties versus presidents in Tanzania and Cameroon

Abstract

State capacity is arguably an essential factor that stabilizes electoral authoritarian rule. Yet, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa many measures of state capacity are generally weak. What therefore explains the persistence of electoral authoritarianism in Africa? This study provides a comparison of Tanzania and Cameroon to highlight two divergent reactions to the problem of power consolidation in Africa. In Cameroon, a centralized presidency and comparatively large coercive apparatus underpinned a strong patrimonial state. By contrast, in Tanzania the ruling party became an institution that integrated elites and appeared to subsume the state. These regime configurations stabilized electoral authoritarianism in unique ways, and led to different dependence on the state during elections. The study sheds new light on contemporary Africa, and the diverse sources of authoritarian resilience in the face of multiparty elections.

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“…As such, regime differences are at least worth exploring as explanatory factors for the variation in African politics. Morse (2018) makes an argument that is somewhat similar to our approach. Comparing Tanzania and Cameroon, he argues that there are different modal patterns of electoral authoritarianism in Africa: whereas some regimes are dominated by strong presidents who personally manage and hold together ruling coalitions, other regimes have institutionalised strong party rule.…”

“…In contrast to many weak parties, TANU (and later on Chama cha Mapinduzi [CCM], translated as “The Revolutionary Party”) actually penetrated the countryside and build a nationwide organisational base (Croke, 2017; Morse, 2014), and strong grassroots support. According to Morse (2018), the party was fairly democratic and institutionalised, and had actual authority. This strategy worked in two directions: it integrated ordinary people into the state and the national project, and gave TANU extensive control over the countryside (Morse, 2018).…”

“…According to Morse (2018), the party was fairly democratic and institutionalised, and had actual authority. This strategy worked in two directions: it integrated ordinary people into the state and the national project, and gave TANU extensive control over the countryside (Morse, 2018). Today’s ruling party CCM was founded in 1977 when TANU merged with Zanzibar’s Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP).…”

“…This does not mean, however, that informal patrimonial politics didn’t exist. In fact, the president has always enjoyed extensive powers, but the system is less personalised than others in Africa (Morse, 2018). Tanzania is rather characterised by a fusion of state and party (Makulilo, 2008).…”

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“…Never again would opposition parties be able to credibly threaten removing Biya at the ballot box. The RDPC won increasingly large legislative majorities throughout the 2000s, and Biya himself ushered in a constitutional change to abolish presidential term limits in 2001 (Letsa 2017;Morse 2018). At the age of 86, he now ranks among the oldest and longest serving civilian leaders in the world.…”