“…Analyses by Grundholm (2020), Song (2022), and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018, 196–7), for instance, demonstrate that autocratic leaders who have consolidated their power over the political and security apparatus are less likely to experience a coup and regime breakdown. Similarly, existing scholarship suggests that leaders who believe they survive in power longer tend to adopt more forward-looking policies, including in the realms of macroeconomic policy objectives (Nordhaus, 1975), investment in public goods (Olson, 1993), the use of foreign aid (Wright, 2008), attention to HIV/ADS (Dionne, 2011), the strength of property rights and the level of inward foreign direct investment (Li, 2009; Moon, 2015), and the use of oil rents (Bellinger and Fails, 2021). The closest prior work is Kendall-Taylor (2011, 2012), who demonstrates that politically secure leaders are more likely to invest natural resource profits abroad, while more vulnerable autocrats opt to spend them domestically in a bid to shore up their support coalition.…”