2020
DOI: 10.1177/1065912920931201
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When Does Oil Harm Child Mortality?

Abstract: When is oil a curse for health outcomes? This paper addresses the question by analyzing the effect of oil wealth on child mortality rates in nondemocratic countries. We argue that oil is particularly likely to harm child mortality when leaders have short time horizons. Such leaders are more likely to use oil revenues to finance private goods and patronage which builds their support coalition at the expense of public goods that benefit the broader population. We test this argument using panel regression and a g… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 74 publications
(64 reference statements)
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“…Wigley (2017) finds that petroleum-poor countries outperform petroleum-rich countries for reducing under-five mortality in a panel of 167 countries. Bellinger and Fails (2020) analyze the effect of oil wealth on child mortality rates in non-democratic countries and identify some specific conditions under which oil can be detrimental to child mortality. What about Africa?…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wigley (2017) finds that petroleum-poor countries outperform petroleum-rich countries for reducing under-five mortality in a panel of 167 countries. Bellinger and Fails (2020) analyze the effect of oil wealth on child mortality rates in non-democratic countries and identify some specific conditions under which oil can be detrimental to child mortality. What about Africa?…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Analyses by Grundholm (2020), Song (2022), and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018, 196–7), for instance, demonstrate that autocratic leaders who have consolidated their power over the political and security apparatus are less likely to experience a coup and regime breakdown. Similarly, existing scholarship suggests that leaders who believe they survive in power longer tend to adopt more forward-looking policies, including in the realms of macroeconomic policy objectives (Nordhaus, 1975), investment in public goods (Olson, 1993), the use of foreign aid (Wright, 2008), attention to HIV/ADS (Dionne, 2011), the strength of property rights and the level of inward foreign direct investment (Li, 2009; Moon, 2015), and the use of oil rents (Bellinger and Fails, 2021). The closest prior work is Kendall-Taylor (2011, 2012), who demonstrates that politically secure leaders are more likely to invest natural resource profits abroad, while more vulnerable autocrats opt to spend them domestically in a bid to shore up their support coalition.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cheibub, 1998; Chen and, Ye 2020; Moon, 2015; Wright, 2008) – are problematic in multiple ways. For an overview of potential flaws with each approach as an operational measure of “time horizons,” see Bellinger and Fails (2021). Second, neither approach measures whether leaders are able to override policy opposition from regime insiders, or conversely whether they must share in the policy-making process with these other elites.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%