Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy

Corazzini, Luca; Kube, Sebastian; Maréchal, Michel André; Nicolò, Antonio

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1430904

Cited by 26 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 75 publications

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“…As mentioned in section 2, Corazzini et al (2014) do find that elected leaders behave more pro-socially than randomly appointed ones. 6 However, there is no evidence that these mechanisms played a role in the present experiment (Leaders in T1&T2 vs. T3&T4, p = .75).…”

Section: C) Is Political Selection Effective?supporting

confidence: 54%

“…Corazzini et al (2014) study a set-up where an elected leader distributes a budget between him-or herself and an electorate. This feature is similar to our design.…”

Section: Related Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While a number of empirical studies of political selection exist, only few have used experimental methods which allow researchers to precisely pin down determinants in stylized environments (e.g. Dasgupta and Williams 2002, Houser, Ludwig and Stratmann 2009, Hamman, Weber and Woon 2011, Corazzini et al 2014, Galeotti and Zizzo 2015 see section 2 for a discussion). This paper focuses on selection of public-spirited versus corrupt leaders at the election stage.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

Markussen

Tyran

2017

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Abstract:In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates' pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

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Section: C) Is Political Selection Effective?supporting

confidence: 54%

“…Corazzini et al (2014) study a set-up where an elected leader distributes a budget between him-or herself and an electorate. This feature is similar to our design.…”

Section: Related Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

Markussen

Tyran

2017

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…6 For the effect of democratically appointed leaders see also Hamman, Weber, andWoon (2011), Corazzini, Kube, Maréchal, andNicolò (2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-sensitive Leviathans

Nicklisch

Grechenig

Thöni

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We study information conditions under which individuals are willing to delegate their sanctioning power to a central authority. We design a public goods game in which players can move between institutional environments, and we vary the observability of others' contributions. We find that the relative popularity of centralized sanctioning crucially depends on the interaction between the observability of the cooperation of others and the absence of punishment targeted at cooperative individuals. While central institutions do not outperform decentralized sanctions under perfect information, large parts of the population are attracted by central institutions that rarely punish cooperative individuals in environments with limited observability. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…candidates dislike breaking their promises once they have been elected (Geng et al, 2011;Corazzini et al, 2014;Walkowitz & Weiss, 2017). In our experiment, we do not let participants make promises, and we do not let them either build a reputation.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Social Preferences of Democratically Elected Decision Makers and the Conflict between Wealth Generation and Distribution

Gaudeul

Keser

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe run a laboratory experiment where some participants are selected to make investment decisions on behalf of others. We test whether a democratic context influences the social preferences of decision makers in terms of efficiency, altruism and concern for inequality. We find that decision makers who are selected democratically are generally more efficiency-oriented, but also more altruistic, than leaders who are selected at random or by ability. Because wealth generation and distribution sometime conflict, efficiency is no higher with democratic leaders, although payoffs are more equal. We interpret our results in terms of a democratic norm that mitigates how elections may otherwise lead to an enhanced feeling of entitlement to one's role. We exclude a selection effect and discuss the drivers of our results in terms of belief in the legitimacy of the selection procedure and reduced social distance.JEL Codes: C91, D63, D64

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Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy

Cited by 26 publications

References 75 publications

Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

Information-sensitive Leviathans

The Social Preferences of Democratically Elected Decision Makers and the Conflict between Wealth Generation and Distribution

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