Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy

Abstract

Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This article proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These nonpecuniary costs imply that campaigns influence subsequent behavior, even in the absence of reputational or image concerns. Our lab experiments reveal that promises are more than cheap talk. They influence the behavior of both voters and their representatives. We observe that the electorate is better off when their leaders are elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously—but only in the presence of electoral campaigns. In addition, we find that representatives are more likely to serve the public interest when their approval rates are high. Altogether, our results suggest that elections and campaigns confer important benefits beyond their screening and sanctioning functions.

An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

“…In this article, we largely confirm the results of Corazzini et al () who find a relatively high promise‐fulfillment rate and that election promises have a significant influence on the voters' beliefs and voting decisions. Also in line with Corazzini et al (), we find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between election promises, beliefs, and voting with decreased credibility of very high promises. In addition to previous results, we show that election promises are more likely to be kept if reelection is possible and if the politician was voted into office rather than randomly allocated.…”

“…A similar explanation for this type of behavior is reciprocity of the politician towards the voters displayed trust by their election decision (see Falk & Fischbacher, ; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, ). Reciprocity or intrinsic motivation triggered by an election would be in line with Corazzini et al's () finding that higher vote shares increase the generosity of a politician.…”

“…Some recent experimental work did investigate promises in a political setting. In a set‐up similar to ours, Corazzini, Kube, Maréchal, and Nicolò () find that pledge‐fulfillment levels are around 60% in the absence of a reelection motive. In addition, they show that election promises have a significant influence on the voters' beliefs and voting decisions.…”

“…As the theoretical literature is divided about the relevance of promises—with preelection models on one side and postelection models on the other side—the literature's prediction about whether promises influence voters' beliefs is divided too. Based on theories originating from Downs () as well as previous empirical findings (Corazzini et al, ; Elinder et al, ) we expect that promises influence voters beliefs. Based on Corrazzini et al's (2014) findings, we expect an inverted U‐shaped relationship, such that particularly high promises are less credible.…”

Deception and Political Participation: Theory and Laboratory Evidence

“…Using a different theoretical framework, Alesina and Cukierman (1990) identify conditions when it is advantageous for politicians to take ambiguous policy positions. Corazzini et al (2014) performed related experimental work examining nonbinding candidate promises. 9 Starting with Banks (1990), models of spatial electoral competition allow candidates to strategically misrepresent their policy intentions, though in doing so they might incur some cost of lying (see, e.g., Callander andWilkie 2007 andKartik andMcAfee 2007).…”