Election commissions and non-democratic outcomes: Thailand’s contentious 2019 election

Abstract

Responding to a recent call for more in-depth qualitative studies of electoral management bodies (EMBs), this article examines formally independent EMBs by using the example of the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) and the role it played in the recent 2019 election. We argue that in non-democratic regimes with high levels of political polarisation and entrenched elites, formal EMB independence may become part of the problem why elections fail. It creates opportunities for long-term EMB capture by actors who wield power outside of formal politics and are unaccountable to public interest. In case of the ECT, this has led to the decreasing electoral standards culminating in the highly contentious 2019 election where the ECT’s administrative efficiency and effectiveness of voting came secondary to pleasing the entrenched old Thai elite. Its conduct has reduced Thailand’s prospects for a peaceful transition to democratic rule as those who oppose the country’s old elite have increasingly limited opportunities to challenge it through formal means.

Autocratic Electoral Management: Lessons From Thailand

“…The institutionalisation of network monarchy culminated in the passage of the 1997 constitution that introduced a new check and balance system on executive power by creating formally independent oversight institutions—including the ECT, the Constitutional Court (CC), the Administrative Court and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (for the full list, see Khemthong, 2023: 163)—and populating them with “good people” who would stay loyal to the traditional elite (McCargo, 2005: 512). To ensure such loyalty was possible, the 1997 constitution exempted these institutions from political oversight and gave them significant de jure independence, extensive powers, and decision-making autonomy (Desatova and Saowanee, 2021: 5; Khemthong, 2023: 163). Their task was to prevent elected politicians from challenging the power and interests of the traditional elite through means other than military coups.…”

“…Unable to defeat him at the polls, the traditional elite ousted him from power in the 2006 military coup and redesigned the 1997 check and balance system to prevent its future capture by elected politicians like Thaksin. The key changes introduced in the 2007 and 2017 military-drafted constitutions concerned the composition of the ad hoc panel responsible for selecting ECT commissioners, and the composition of the CC and its nomination process: Both became dominated by career judges who are loyal to the traditional elite (Dressel and Khemthong, 2019: 5; McCargo, 2019: 62; Desatova and Saowanee, 2021: 7; Khemthong, 2023: 165). These changes essentially weaponised the ECT and the CC by removing all traces of political and public accountability.…”

“…These changes essentially weaponised the ECT and the CC by removing all traces of political and public accountability. Another important change included the expansion of the ECT and CC powers to disqualify elected politicians and dissolve political parties (Dressel and Khemthong, 2019: 6; Desatova and Saowanee, 2021: 7). As a result, much of the power of Thailand's post-2006 coup electoral governance network rests in the hands of a few powerful and politically unaccountable actors: the traditional elite, the ECT and the CC.…”

“…In this paper, I test Birch and van Ham's “substitution effect” model on the 2019 general election in Thailand, the first election following the country's 2014 military coup. While nobody had expected the 2019 poll to be “free and fair” due to wide-ranging political restrictions and the ECT's pro-junta bias, the ECT still faced considerable public criticism and a wave of online and offline protests that called for the impeachment of the seven election commissioners (Desatova and Saowanee, 2021: 7–9). Despite this, substitution did not occur.…”

Buddhism and Comparative Constitutional Law

“…The Constitutional Court raised no objection to the junta's legitimacy. Meanwhile, the EC helped intimidate dissidents in the 2016 constitutional referendum (Desatova & Alexander 2021) and the NACC charged Yingluck Shinawatra and her ministers of corruption.…”