Elaborating the Individual Difference Component in Deterrence Theory

Abstract

Deterrence theory and criminal justice policy hold that punishment enhances compliance and deters future criminal activity. Empirical research, however, is decidedly mixed, with some studies finding that punishment weakens compliance, some finding that sanctions have no effect on compliance, and some finding that the effect of sanctions depends on moderating factors. In this review, we do not consider whether sanctions affect compliance but instead consider the conditions under which sanctions affect compliance. Specifically, we focus on understanding the kinds-of-people dimension of sanctions and deterrence to include individual differences (in social bonding, morality, discount rate, impulsivity, social network position, decision-making competence) and situational differences (in emotions, alcohol/drug use). Upon reviewing the empirical evidence, we identify important gaps for theoretical and empirical work and comment on how this work relates to public policy. 335 Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. 2011.7:335-360. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by University of Central Florida on 02/04/15. For personal use only.

Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment

“…They have for instance studied the effects of overconfidence (Dunning et al 1990;, hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997;Loughran et al 2012) and ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg 1961;Loughran et al 2011) on the decision to commit crime. This ties into older work on a self-serving bias in the estimated effect of sanctions (Nagin and Pogarsky 2003), the perceived fairness of sanctions (Piquero et al 2004), the motivating force of identity (Paternoster and Bushway 2008) and of morality (Paternoster and Simpson 1996;Brezina and Piquero 2007) and the ensuing disciplining effect of shaming (Rebellon et al 2010), as well as work on impulsivity Nagin and Pogarsky 2003), on the perception of the risk of sanctions (Paternoster et al 1983;Klepper and Nagin 1989;Nagin and Paternoster 1991) and on inter-individual differences (Nagin and Paternoster 1993;Nagin and Paternoster 1994;Piquero et al 2011;.…”

When sanctions convey moral norms

“…For example, in a study among business entrepreneurs, Goslinga and Denkers (2009) showed that law complying intentions were higher when sanctions were severe rather than mild. Still, criminology literature has argued and found that compliance with laws depends more on punishment certainty rather than harshness (Jacobs and Piquero 2013;Piquero et al 2011;Pratt et al 2006). For example, research by Varma and Doob (1998) among Canadian tax payers found that perceived penalties were less important determinants of tax evasion than perceptions of possibility of being apprehended.…”

“…Also, the role of detection probability may be investigated further. From a purely deterrence perspective, it has been suggested that detection probability is more powerful than sanction severity (Jacobs and Piquero 2013;Piquero et al 2011;Pratt et al 2006;Varma and Doob 1998). However, does detection probability also affect moral norms?…”

Dissuasion conditionnelle, programme d’accès graduel à la conduite et infractions routières

“…Une façon d'aborder ces questions consiste à s'inspirer de la théorie de la dissuasion conditionnelle (Piquero et al, 2011). À la différence de la dissuasion classique, la théorie de la dissuasion conditionnelle soutient que l'effet de la menace et de l'imposition de sanctions varie en fonction des types d'infraction, des contextes et des caractéristiques des individus (Andenaes, 1974 ;Geerken et Gove, 1975 ;Piquero et al, 2011).…”

“…Pour ce faire, cet article s'inspire des travaux sur la dissuasion conditionnelle (Geerken et Gove, 1975 ;Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky et Loughran, 2011 ;Zimring, Hawkins et Vorenberg, 1973). En raison des conditions qui accompagnent un permis restreint (p. ex.…”