We propose a model that integrates the extralegal consequences from conviction and impulsivity into the traditional deterrence framework. The model was tested with 252 college students, who completed a survey concerning drinking and driving. Key findings include the following: (1) Although variation in sanction certainty and severity predicted offending, variation in celerity did not; (2) the extralegal consequences from conviction appear to be at least as great a deterrent as the legal consequences; (3) the influence of sanction severity diminished with an individual's “present‐orientation”; and (4) the certainty of punishment was far more robust a deterrent to offending than was the severity of punishment.

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This paper reports results from a randomized experiment in which 256 participants recruited to complete a survey could earn extra payment by cheating on a quiz. We report the first deterrence experiment that incorporates significant elements of situational and individual difference theories of crime into a single analytic framework. Consistent with extant deterrence research, the prevalence of cheating was lower when detection was more certain but not when the penalty was more severe. Further, cheating was more likely among participants with stronger present‐orientation, or who were prone to self‐serving bias.