Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?

Immerman, Richard H.

doi:10.2307/3791100

Cited by 20 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…That evidence showed Sherman Adams to have been essentially the expediter of Eisenhower's wishes in the area of domestic policy, not a decisionmaker in his own right. It revealed John Foster Dulles also to be the president's agent and not an independent operator (Immerman, 1979), although more of a collaborator with Eisenhower in shaping foreign policy than Adams was in domestic policy. Above all, the finding that leaps from the documents released in the 1970s is that Eisenhower himself was the engine of his administration's politics and policy making.…”

Section: Eisenhowermentioning

confidence: 99%

Ronald Reagan—Another Hidden-Hand Ike?

Greenstein¹

1990

APSC

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Name the president.He was enormously popular during his eight years in the White House. In contrast to Truman, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, he not only entered but also left office riding high in the polls. Yet when he stepped down the experts who make it their business to observe presidents closely did not join in the public adulation. The verdict of the Washington watchers was that he had been a passive participant in his own presidency, remaining disconnected from day-to-day politics and policy.For the young this can have been only one president—Ronald Reagan. But those whose political memories reach back to the 1950s may recognize that he could also have been the only other two-term president in the post-New Deal era—Dwight D. Eisenhower.The description of Ike as out of the loop in his own presidency was unquestioned at the time that Eisenhower left office. When Arthur Schlesinger asked a panel of distinguished students of the presidency to rank 31 American presidents in terms of greatness, they placed Eisenhower 21st—a tie with Chester A. Arthur (Schlesinger, 1962).

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Section: Eisenhowermentioning

confidence: 99%

Ronald Reagan—Another Hidden-Hand Ike?

Greenstein¹

1990

APSC

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“… The work by both Greenstein () and Immerman (, ) further discredit earlier depictions of Eisenhower as a weak and deferential president. Instead, both authors present evidence of Eisenhower as an active and engaged leader who kept a tight hold over the decision‐making process.…”

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confidence: 91%

Eisenhower's Scientists: Policy Entrepreneurs and the Test-Ban Debate 1954-1958

Macdonald

2013

Foreign Policy Anal

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What accounts for the variation in the influence of scientists in the policy‐making process? Why is it that scientists sometimes appear to exercise significant autonomy in shaping policy agendas, while at other times very little? Scientists are most influential, this paper contends, when they can leverage their recognized expertise by strategically co‐opting institutionalized channels of advice. This is most likely to occur in issue areas of high complexity and ambiguity when key policy makers are dependent upon scientists for their counsel. Policy entrepreneurs within competing scientific communities, prevented from accessing key decision makers, wait until windows of opportunity open to undermine the credibility of the incumbent experts, gain access to political leaders, and refocus the policy agenda. This theory is developed and tested through a case‐study analysis of the nuclear test‐ban debate during the Eisenhower administration from 1954 to 1958. The findings of this paper underscore the need to treat foreign policy decision making as a series of strategic interactions between multiple actors with a broader capacity to influence the policy‐making process than traditionally conceived. By doing so, scholars can better understand variations in government decision making across time and issue area, providing important insights into the role of experts in a wide range of public policy domains.

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“…The organizational environment in which the leader operates and the role that his or her advisors play in decision making might also result in leaders framing situations differently. These individuals are often central to political leaders’ decision making and can have an enormous impact on foreign policy outcomes (see, e.g., Immerman 1979; Greenstein 1982; Shapiro, Kumar, and Jacobs 2000; Preston 2001). Advisors in pivotal positions such as the Secretary of State or Defense can shape the risk perceptions of leaders through the information that they share and the opinions that they impart.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions

Macdonald

Schneider

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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In this article, we explore how presidential risk orientations affect force employment decisions through an analysis of the use of unmanned weaponry during the Bush and Obama administrations. We hypothesize that the conception of risk plays an integral part in this choice of weaponry. In order to examine our hypothesis, we utilize the verbs-in-context system of operational code analysis to quantify the risk propensities of President Bush and President Obama during the Afghanistan War from 2001 to 2013. At the aggregate level, we find that the two presidents exhibit unique interpretations of risk with respect to manned versus unmanned weaponry. We further disaggregate our data to examine whether these preferences are fixed or fluctuate with situational changes. We find that President Bush’s risk calculations are influenced by a number of situational variables, highlighting the importance of changing decision contexts in explaining risk behaviors. President Obama’s risk calculations, on the other hand, remain constant over time lending credence to the importance of overall risk propensity in determining risk-taking behaviors. Our findings indicate that risk is an important variable in explaining the means of force employed during conflict, and that the source of this behavior can vary by leader.

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Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?

Cited by 20 publications

References 5 publications

Ronald Reagan—Another Hidden-Hand Ike?

Ronald Reagan—Another Hidden-Hand Ike?

Eisenhower's Scientists: Policy Entrepreneurs and the Test-Ban Debate 1954-1958

Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions

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