Efficient Dynamic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks: Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (C-DSL)

Hakim, Kamrul; Jayaweera, Sudharman K.; El-Howayek, Georges; Mosquera, Carlos

doi:10.1109/twc.2010.072210.100227

Cited by 27 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Our approach is different from previous non-cooperative DSL games [3][4][5][6][7]. The advantage is Pareto efficiency of outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Jayaweera et al [5] improved their method by considering PU's utility as an increasing function of IC (and therefore profit). Generalizations to multiple primary systems are provided in [6,7]. In [3][4][5][6][7] PU and SUs play a Leaderfollower game to maximize their utilities and making proper decisions about IC and transmission powers, respectively.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Generalizations to multiple primary systems are provided in [6,7]. In [3][4][5][6][7] PU and SUs play a Leaderfollower game to maximize their utilities and making proper decisions about IC and transmission powers, respectively. In this game, each player (PU/SU) individually maximizes its utility and Nash Equilibrium (NE) would be the outcome.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Game theory is the convenient tool for analyzing PU-SU interactions in DSL. Some works propose non-cooperative game to model DSL method [3][4][5][6][7]. In these methods, PU defines tolerable interference from SUs as interference cap (IC).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooperative primary–secondary dynamic spectrum leasing game via decentralized bargaining

2015

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Dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) has been proposed as a solution for better spectrum utilization. Most of the work focused on non-cooperative game to model primary/secondary users interactions in DSL approach. Some others introduced cooperative game just for secondary users (SUs). In this paper, both primary users (PUs) and SUs incentives and level of satisfactions are considered. Nash bargaining is developed with both PUs and SUs as bargainers. A simple pricing approach is introduced which makes the proposed method practically feasible. On one hand, SUs adjust their power regarding to price and tolerable interference which are announced by PU. On the other hand, PU adjusts its tolerable interference to maximize its profit. Simulation results verify the viability of proposed method.

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“…Our approach is different from previous non-cooperative DSL games [3][4][5][6][7]. The advantage is Pareto efficiency of outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Cooperative primary–secondary dynamic spectrum leasing game via decentralized bargaining

2015

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“…Moreover, the Game I propose is in a C-DSL context, letting the primary users play an active role and make their own decisions, see [24], [25] for DSL and [26] for C-DSL. The mathematical treatment is dedicated to the proof of existence of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium, see [27] and [28], in a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (also named Coupled Constraint Equilibrium Problem) where the strategy sets of the mobiles are not independent of each other.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem for Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Leasing

Prati¹

2013

Int. J. of Pure and Appl. Math.

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The dramatic increase of wireless devices in telecommunications is underlining the inefficiency of the traditional spectrum allocation system. A novel scheme for resource allocation is the Dynamic Spectrum Sharing (DSS), where primary users, the exclusive owners of the spectrum rights, allow the secondary ones to share their licensed frequency band.In this paper, a time-continuous model is presented for Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (C-DSL). This kind of model involves the active participation of both the primary and secondary users in order to share the same frequency band.I treat the problem of secondary power allocation like a non-cooperative Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) where the primary communication system is willing to allow the secondary users to share its spectrum band and consequently adjusts the maximum tolerable interference in order to obtain the greatest gain, while the secondary users play the game by choosing the most convenient powers to be allocated, in order to obtain a good quality signal and avoid an excessive interference.I give mathematical conditions, easy to be verified locally at the secondary receivers, that ensure the existence of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium for the game.

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References

2014

Signal Processing for Cognitive Radios

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Efficient Dynamic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks: Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (C-DSL)

Cited by 27 publications

References 14 publications

Cooperative primary–secondary dynamic spectrum leasing game via decentralized bargaining

Cooperative primary–secondary dynamic spectrum leasing game via decentralized bargaining

A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem for Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Leasing

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