2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.07.008
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Effects of monitoring and incentives on supplier performance: An agency theory perspective

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
60
0
2

Year Published

2018
2018
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
10

Relationship

1
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 49 publications
(79 citation statements)
references
References 136 publications
(133 reference statements)
2
60
0
2
Order By: Relevance
“…Suppliers tend to adhere to rules and regulations so that they are able to reduce the risk of potential losses or complications such as business termination (Blome et al, 2017). Obviously, the main reason for monitoring, rewarding and punishing suppliers is to ensure their products or parts are aligned to quality requirements from the buying firm (Maestrini et al, 2018); this approach indirectly influences and improves suppliers' RSCP. Being inactive in monitoring suppliers' adoption of RSC practices often means that there is less communication, feedback and monitoring of the suppliers, pointing towards a lack of collaborative activities between buying firms and suppliers in the realisation of environmental sustainability in supply chains (Agi and Nishant, 2017;Blome et al, 2017;Gosling et al, 2017).…”
Section: Managementby-exceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Suppliers tend to adhere to rules and regulations so that they are able to reduce the risk of potential losses or complications such as business termination (Blome et al, 2017). Obviously, the main reason for monitoring, rewarding and punishing suppliers is to ensure their products or parts are aligned to quality requirements from the buying firm (Maestrini et al, 2018); this approach indirectly influences and improves suppliers' RSCP. Being inactive in monitoring suppliers' adoption of RSC practices often means that there is less communication, feedback and monitoring of the suppliers, pointing towards a lack of collaborative activities between buying firms and suppliers in the realisation of environmental sustainability in supply chains (Agi and Nishant, 2017;Blome et al, 2017;Gosling et al, 2017).…”
Section: Managementby-exceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Doctoral research often adopts game theory to investigate issues, such as SC coordination, pricing, and network equilibrium, based on the competition between SC partners (Hou et al , 2020; Esmaeili et al , 2016; Zhao et al , 2010). The second most frequently used theory was agency theory (8.8 percent), which has been used frequently to examine the appropriate contract and incentive mechanisms in the principal−agent relationships between SC partners (Maestrini et al , 2018; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). The third most commonly adopted theory is optimization theory (8.4 percent).…”
Section: Descriptive Analyses and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Há, ainda, estudos bibliográficos sobre as produções relativas a teoria da agência e contabilidade (Martinez, 1998), gestão contábil e teoria da agência (Boučková, 2015), teoria da agência em países em desenvolvimento (Yusuf, Yousaf, & Saeed, 2018), gestão de suprimentos e teoria da agência (Maestrini, Luzzini, Caniato, & Ronchi, 2018), teoria da agência e governança corporativa (Machado, Fernandes, & Bianchi, 2016) e corrupção, moralidade tributária e teoria da agência (Siddiqui, 2017). Apesar disso, não foram encontrados estudos aplicando a teoria da agência à tributação de empresas da economia digital.…”
Section: Asaaunclassified