2019
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12251
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Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality and Audit Quality

Abstract: A widely held assumption in policy making and empirical research is that increasing the strength of public enforcement improves financial reporting quality and audit quality. This paper provides a more nuanced view. In a model with a manager who can manage earnings, a strategic auditor, and an enforcement institution, we show that enforcement and auditing are complements in a weak enforcement regime but can be substitutes in a strong regime. Although stronger enforcement always mitigates earnings management, t… Show more

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Cited by 71 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…The second measure is restricted to extreme forms of auditor conservatism and misses the more subtle downward bias which might be incorporated into the published financial statements on the part of the auditor as captured by our model. Overall, the insights provided by our analysis have the following main empirical implications: Our findings underline the importance to carefully disentangle the sphere of the preparer and the auditor when examining the effects of enforcement activities (see also Ewert and Wagenhofer 2019). Focusing on the enforcement of judgmental accounting decisions, we outline the ambiguous implications of increasing auditor conservatism for audit and financial reporting quality.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 66%
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“…The second measure is restricted to extreme forms of auditor conservatism and misses the more subtle downward bias which might be incorporated into the published financial statements on the part of the auditor as captured by our model. Overall, the insights provided by our analysis have the following main empirical implications: Our findings underline the importance to carefully disentangle the sphere of the preparer and the auditor when examining the effects of enforcement activities (see also Ewert and Wagenhofer 2019). Focusing on the enforcement of judgmental accounting decisions, we outline the ambiguous implications of increasing auditor conservatism for audit and financial reporting quality.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 66%
“…As enforcement actions not only reveal misconduct by the reporting entity, but simultaneously indicate a poor audit quality (Fearnley et al 2002), they are assumed to unfold a disciplinary effect on the behavior of both, the preparer and the auditor in charge (Berger 2010;Ewert and Wagenhofer 2019). While the preparer should typically be prevented from earnings manipulation (Dechow, Sloan, et al 1996;Ernstberger et al 2012;Böcking et al 2015), the auditor is expected to increase her audit effort and thus audit quality (Fearnley et al 2002;Meusburger and Pelger 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Financial reporting quality does not always improve with greater enforcement strength. It mainly depends on the proxy for financial reporting quality [9].…”
Section: Financial Management and Innovation Possibilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%