Effects of Hydrologic Conditions and Reservoir Operation on Transboundary Cooperation in the Lancang–Mekong River Basin

Yu, Yang; Zhao, Jianshi; Li, Dongnan; Wang, Zhongjing

doi:10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0001075

Cited by 43 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…This research was funded by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2017YFC0404403 and 2016YFC0401302) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (91747208, 51861125102, and 51579129) and was also supported by CSC scholarship. The data for model used in this study can be addressed from published work by Yu et al () and MRC (2010), which have been appropriately cited.…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

Tang

Zhao

et al. 2019

Water Resources Research

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Cooperation in transboundary river basins can make water resources systems more efficient and benefit riparian stakeholders. However, in a basin with upstream and downstream stakeholders that have different interests, noncooperative outcomes have often been observed. These can be described by a one‐shot prisoners' dilemma game where noncooperation (defection) is a dominant equilibrium strategy. However, cooperative outcomes have also been observed in several transboundary settings, such as the Lancang‐Mekong River Basin in Asia. Such cooperation motivates our research effort to refine relevant game theoretic descriptions to account for the evolution of players' behaviors, from conflict to cooperation. In this study, a repeated game model is proposed to analyze evolutionary transboundary cooperation. A generalized evolutionary cooperation pattern with four stages is summarized, starting with noncooperation and ending with in‐depth cooperation. The Lancang‐Mekong River Basin and three other typical transboundary river management case studies are chosen to validate our theoretical findings. Upstream and downstream stakeholder behaviors are analyzed for these case studies, in accordance with a game payoff matrix that accounts for incentives to cooperate. The results indicate that patience and incremental benefits can lead stakeholders to adopt a cooperative equilibrium strategy if appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place. Such mechanisms can be developed through negotiations that recognize the wide range of stakeholder interests that may influence the decision to cooperate. Our analysis suggests that game theory can provide useful insights into the conditions and institutional mechanisms that foster cooperative strategies for managing transboundary water resources.

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Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

Tang

Zhao

et al. 2019

Water Resources Research

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“…Here the loss indicates deviation from their maximum expected benefit instead of absolute loss, because human values outcomes as gains and losses relative to a reference level (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). To obtain indirect political benefits, which is described as "diplomatic returns" in Yu et al (2019b), the upstream country China has worked to change flow regulations of their reservoirs to satisfy the demands of the downstream countries and achieve regional cooperation. One example of this is the emergency water release from China in 2016 to alleviate the effects of a severe drought in the lower Mekong basin (Yu et al, 2019b).…”

Section: Study Area and Historical Timeline Of Cooperation And Conflimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To obtain indirect political benefits, which is described as "diplomatic returns" in Yu et al (2019b), the upstream country China has worked to change flow regulations of their reservoirs to satisfy the demands of the downstream countries and achieve regional cooperation. One example of this is the emergency water release from China in 2016 to alleviate the effects of a severe drought in the lower Mekong basin (Yu et al, 2019b). This change of hydropower dam regulations in upstream countries can be regarded as an example of a cooperative response.…”

Section: Study Area and Historical Timeline Of Cooperation And Conflimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Socio-Hydrologic Modeling of the Dynamics of Cooperation in the Transboundary Lancang-Mekong River

You

Guo

Borzì

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Abstract. The transboundary Lancang-Mekong River Basin has experienced dynamics of cooperation over the past several decades, which is a common emergent response in transboundary human-water systems. Downstream countries rely on Mekong River for fisheries, agriculture, etc., while upstream countries have been constructing dams to generate hydropower. The dam construction and operation in upstream countries have changed the seasonality of streamflow in downstream countries, affecting their economic benefits. More recently, cooperation between upstream and downstream countries has been enhanced throughout the river basin. In this study, we introduce a quantitative socio-hydrological model to simulate hydrological processes, reservoir operations, economic benefits, policy feedbacks and therefore dynamics of cooperation within the Lancang-Mekong River basin. The model reproduces the observed dynamics of cooperation in the basin revealed by sentiment analysis of news articles. Hydrological variability such as droughts and human activities associated with reservoir operations affect dynamics of cooperation between the riparian countries, with importance attached to indirect political benefits of upstream playing an important role in the enhancement of cooperation. In this way, our study generated understanding of emergent cooperation dynamics in this transboundary river basin, and the socio-hydrological model used here provides a useful new framework to investigate and improve transboundary water management elsewhere.

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“…This research was funded by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2017YFC0404403 and 2016YFC0401302) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (91747208, 51861125102, and 51579129) and was also supported by CSC scholarship. The data for model used in this study can be addressed from published work by Yu et al (2019) and MRC (2010), which have been appropriately cited.…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary cooperation in transboundary river basins

Tang

Zhao³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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<p>Cooperation in transboundary river basins can make water resources systems more efficient and benefit riparian stakeholders. However, in a basin with upstream and downstream stakeholders that have different interests, non-cooperative outcomes have often been observed. These can be described by a one shot prisoners&#8217; dilemma game where non-cooperation (defection) is a dominant equilibrium strategy. However, cooperative outcomes have also been observed in several transboundary settings, such as the Lancang-Mekong River Basin (LMRB) in Asia. Such cooperation motivates our research effort to refine relevant game theoretic descriptions to account for the evolution of players&#8217; behaviors, from conflict to cooperation. In this study, a repeated game model is proposed to analyze evolutionary transboundary cooperation. A generalized evolutionary cooperation pattern with four stages is summarized, starting with non-cooperation and ending with in-depth cooperation. The LMRB and three other typical transboundary river management case studies are chosen to validate our theoretical findings. Upstream and downstream stakeholder behaviors are analyzed for these case studies, in accordance with a game payoff matrix that accounts for incentives to cooperate. The results indicate that patience and incremental benefits can lead stakeholders to adopt a cooperative equilibrium strategy if appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place. Such mechanisms can be developed through negotiations that recognize the wide range of stakeholder interests that may influence the decision to cooperate. Our analysis suggests that game theory can provide useful insights into the conditions and institutional mechanisms that foster cooperative strategies for managing transboundary water resources.</p>

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Effects of Hydrologic Conditions and Reservoir Operation on Transboundary Cooperation in the Lancang–Mekong River Basin

Cited by 43 publications

References 48 publications

Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

Socio-Hydrologic Modeling of the Dynamics of Cooperation in the Transboundary Lancang-Mekong River

Evolutionary cooperation in transboundary river basins

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