Evolutionary cooperation in transboundary river basins

Abstract

<p>Cooperation in transboundary river basins can make water resources systems more efficient and benefit riparian stakeholders. However, in a basin with upstream and downstream stakeholders that have different interests, non-cooperative outcomes have often been observed. These can be described by a one shot prisoners’ dilemma game where non-cooperation (defection) is a dominant equilibrium strategy. However, cooperative outcomes have also been observed in several transboundary settings, such as the Lancang-Mekong River Basin (LMRB) in Asia. Such cooperation motivates our research effort to refine relevant game theoretic descriptions to account for the evolution of players’ behaviors, from conflict to cooperation. In this study, a repeated game model is proposed to analyze evolutionary transboundary cooperation. A generalized evolutionary cooperation pattern with four stages is summarized, starting with non-cooperation and ending with in-depth cooperation. The LMRB and three other typical transboundary river management case studies are chosen to validate our theoretical findings. Upstream and downstream stakeholder behaviors are analyzed for these case studies, in accordance with a game payoff matrix that accounts for incentives to cooperate. The results indicate that patience and incremental benefits can lead stakeholders to adopt a cooperative equilibrium strategy if appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place. Such mechanisms can be developed through negotiations that recognize the wide range of stakeholder interests that may influence the decision to cooperate. Our analysis suggests that game theory can provide useful insights into the conditions and institutional mechanisms that foster cooperative strategies for managing transboundary water resources.</p>

Transboundary cooperation in infrastructure operation generates economic and environmental co-benefits to the Lancang-Mekong River Basin

“…Cooperation 34 to progress towards economic-environmental sustainability. On the basis of these findings, we highlight three key principles for implementing full cooperation for existing and planned infrastructure development in the LMRB.…”

A socio-hydrological framework for understanding conflict and cooperation with respect to transboundary rivers

“…Further relaxing the unbounded rationality of actors using behavioural economic models (Conlisk, 1996), Schill et al (2019) recognised that whether people choose to cooperate or not, with respect to transboundary rivers, depends on one country's expectations regarding the absolute economic benefits, their benefits in previous periods as a reference level, relative gains compared with other countries, and intangible benefits (such as ecological, social, political, or diplomatic benefits). This led to integration with game theory, agent-based models, and system dynamic models to simulate conflict and cooperation with respect to transboundary rivers (Yu et al, 2019;Khan et al, 2017;Ding et al, 2016;Sehlke and Jacobson, 2005). However, criticisms of these models remain: there are constant difficulties in defining and differentiating social factors beyond their economic benefits.…”

Regulation strategy for industrial park considering wind power and electricity price based on the cooperative game model

“…For example, reference [6] realizes the grid connection and accommodation of new energy through the optimal configuration of energy storage at the source network side, but to achieve a better coordinated dispatching effect of new energy, higher investment and construction costs and energy storage utilization efficiency are required [7] [8]. Secondly, through the coordination and complementation between the source, network, load and storage, the load fluctuation of new energy is suppressed, and the grid connection consumption of new energy is promoted [9] [10]. The common cost saving problem is solved by using cooperative game theory [10].…”