Effects of fear and anger on perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment

Lerner, Jennifer S.; Gonzalez, Roxana M.; Small, Deborah A.; Fischhoff, Baruch

doi:10.1037/e633872013-121

Cited by 243 publications

(394 citation statements)

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“…Similarly, neuropsychological research suggests that people generate affect in conjunction with moral judgment and that these affective states subsequently guide moral judgment and choice (Damasio, 1994;Greene & Haidt, 2002;Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Other related research also has found that discrete emotions color people's subsequent judgments and decisions in a number of contexts, many of which appear to be potentially morally loaded (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994;DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000;Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993;Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003;Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Taken together, these results are consistent with the notion that people's affective reactions to the outcome of the trials influenced their judgments of fairness.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger?

Mullen

Skitka

2006

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

207

179

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When people have strong moral convictions about outcomes, their judgments of both outcome and procedural fairness become driven more by whether outcomes support or oppose their moral mandates than by whether procedures are proper or improper (the moral mandate effect). Two studies tested 3 explanations for the moral mandate effect. In particular, people with moral mandates may (a) have a greater motivation to seek out procedural flaws when outcomes fail to support their moral point of view (the motivated reasoning hypothesis), (b) be influenced by in-group distributive biases as a result of identifying with parties that share rather than oppose their moral point of view (the group differentiation hypothesis), or (c) react with anger when outcomes are inconsistent with their moral point of view, which, in turn, colors perceptions of both outcomes and procedures (the anger hypothesis). Results support the anger hypothesis.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger?

Mullen

Skitka

2006

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

207

179

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Thus, we are more concerned with the generalizability than the representativeness of the samples collected by Web questionnaires and with choosing the method best suited for the target population. Ideally, psychological data should be obtained in samples representative of the population to which the findings are to be generalized (e.g., Lerner, Gonzales, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003).…”

Section: Oliver P Johnmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should We Trust Web-Based Studies? A Comparative Analysis of Six Preconceptions About Internet Questionnaires.

Gosling

Vazire

Srivastava

et al. 2004

American Psychologist

2,437

1,612

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“…People overestimate low-probability risks, including the risk of being injured in a terrorist attack, the risk of getting cancer, or the risk of dying in the coming year (Fischhoff, Bruine de Bruin, Parker, Milstein, & Halpern-Felsher, 2006;Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003;Woloshin, Schwartz, Black, & Welch, 1999). Note that these are easy tasks, in the sense that low risk means that the positive outcome is the one most likely to occur.…”

Section: Underestimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, women dramatically overestimate their chances of contracting breast cancer yet believe they are at less risk than other women (Woloshin et al, 1999). Americans overestimate the risk of being injured in a terrorist attack but believe they are at less risk than other Americans (Lerner et al, 2003).…”

Section: Extensions and Applications Of Our Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The trouble with overconfidence.

Moore

Healy

2008

Psychological Review

1,852

1,414

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The authors present a reconciliation of 3 distinct ways in which the research literature has defined overconfidence: (a) overestimation of one's actual performance, (b) overplacement of one's performance relative to others, and (c) excessive precision in one's beliefs. Experimental evidence shows that reversals of the first 2 (apparent underconfidence), when they occur, tend to be on different types of tasks. On difficult tasks, people overestimate their actual performances but also mistakenly believe that they are worse than others; on easy tasks, people underestimate their actual performances but mistakenly believe they are better than others. The authors offer a straightforward theory that can explain these inconsistencies. Overprecision appears to be more persistent than either of the other 2 types of overconfidence, but its presence reduces the magnitude of both overestimation and overplacement.

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Effects of fear and anger on perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment

Cited by 243 publications

References 0 publications

Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger?

Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger?

Should We Trust Web-Based Studies? A Comparative Analysis of Six Preconceptions About Internet Questionnaires.

The trouble with overconfidence.

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