Economies with Land—A Game Theoretical Approach

Legut, Jerzy; Potters, J.A.M.; Tijs, S.H.

doi:10.1006/game.1994.1024

Cited by 16 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…The common initializing elements for both versions are listed in Table 1. The first version computes upper and lower bounds for v(Γ, w) and updates the coefficient vector α through the subgradient rule (16). Both bounds are updated by means of a simple comparison with the old ones.…”

Section: The Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Brams and Taylor [6] discuss the issue of the manipulability of the preferences: in most cases children may benefit from declaring false preferences. A different approach takes into account the possibility for the children to form coalitions after (Legut [15] and Legut et al [16]) or before (Dall'Aglio et al [8]) the division of the cake. In both cases coalitional games are defined and analysed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Finding maxmin allocations in cooperative and competitive fair division

Dall’Aglio

Luca

2014

Ann Oper Res

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Section: The Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Finding maxmin allocations in cooperative and competitive fair division

Dall’Aglio

Luca

2014

Ann Oper Res

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“…Afterwards, they may trade parts of their slices with other players for mutual benefit. A formal model for the cooperative behavior of players who already own slices of the cake and exchange their endowments was first examined in Legut (1990) and Legut, Potters and Tijs (1994) in the context of economies with land. In that setting the players' endowments are arbitrary as long as they form a partition of X.…”

Section: Cooperation After the Division Versus Cooperation Before Thementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This time side payments are allowed and a TU game is defined. The same model is also considered by Legut, Potters and Tijs (1994) who characterize the TU game and its core in great detail.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is no interaction of sorts between the two stages, so that in the trading phase any division, no matter how unfair, would be considered just fine. The discrepancy was already noted by Legut, Potters and Tijs (1994) who kept the name of "fair division game" for the exchange model they analyzed, but noted in a footnote that "this name does not seem to be very appropriate in the present situation but in Legut (1990) this term has been introduced for games of this kind where the initial endowment [. .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooperation in Dividing the Cake

2008

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Cooperation in Dividing the CakeDall'Aglio, M.; Branzei, M.R.; Tijs, S.H. Publication date: 2008 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA):Dall'Aglio, M., Brânzei, R., & Tijs, S. H. (2008). Cooperation in Dividing the Cake. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-101). Tilburg: Operations research. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. AbstractThis paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the division.

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Cooperation in dividing the cake

Dall’Aglio

Brânzei

Tijs

2009

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This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the division.

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Economies with Land—A Game Theoretical Approach

Abstract: Economies with landLegut, J.; Potters, J.A.M.; Tijs, S.H.

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Finding maxmin allocations in cooperative and competitive fair division

Finding maxmin allocations in cooperative and competitive fair division

Cooperation in Dividing the Cake

Cooperation in dividing the cake

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