Economically Enabled Energy Management: Overview and Research Opportunities

Wasa, Yasuaki; Tanaka, Kenta; Tsuji, Takeshi; Managi, Shunsuke; Uchida, Kenko

doi:10.1007/978-981-15-3576-5_1

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 61 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Reiss and White (2008) find that public appeals during the California electricity crisis provided about a 7 percent reduction in electricity usage for residential consumers in San Diego. 12 Allcott and Rogers (2014) find that Table 3. The interval bars show one standard error of the treatment effect.…”

Section: Columns 2 and 4 Ofmentioning

confidence: 96%

Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand

Ito

Ida

Tanaka

2018

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

135

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Firms and governments often use moral suasion and economic incentives to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for economic activities. To investigate persistence of such interventions, we randomly assign households to moral suasion and dynamic pricing that stimulate energy conservation during peak-demand hours. We find significant habituation and dishabituation for moral suasion—the treatment effect diminishes after repeated interventions but can be restored to the original level by a sufficient time interval between interventions. Economic incentives induce larger treatment effects, little habituation, and significant habit formation. Our results suggest moral suasion and economic incentives produce substantially different short-run and long-run policy impacts. (JEL C93, D83, L94, L98, Q41, Q48)

show abstract

Section: Columns 2 and 4 Ofmentioning

confidence: 96%

Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand

Ito

Ida

Tanaka

2018

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

135

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We estimated a linear probability model, which includes a binary choice dependent variable, dummy variables for the treatment groups as independent variables, and a constant term. 15 The constant term gives the ratio of customers in the control group who each purchased an energy-efficient appliance. The coefficients for the treatment dummy variables represent percentage-point increases for the treatment groups.…”

Section: E Mechanisms Behind the Treatment Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Firms and governments often use moral suasion and economic incentives to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for economic activities. To investigate persistence of such interventions, we randomly assign households to moral suasion and dynamic pricing that stimulate energy conservation during peak-demand hours. We find significant habituation and dishabituation for moral suasion-the treatment effect diminishes after repeated interventions but can be restored to the original level by a sufficient time interval between interventions. Economic incentives induce larger treatment effects, little habituation, and significant habit formation. Our results suggest moral suasion and economic incentives produce substantially different short-run and long-run policy impacts.

show abstract

Open‐loop equilibrium seeking in two‐agent noncooperative linear‐quadratic dynamic game with asymmetric horizon length

Wasa

Tanaka

Hayakawa

2023

Asian Journal of Control

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article proposes an iterative‐based algorithm for open‐loop equilibrium seeking in a two‐agent noncooperative dynamic game. The finite‐horizon dynamic games handled in almost all existing articles assume the common prediction horizon length. From the viewpoint of divergence and differences in personal values, it is socially rational to solve the equilibrium of the games with asymmetric prediction horizon length. We thus propose an open‐loop equilibrium‐seeking algorithm without the private knowledge of the other agent's horizon information through a receding‐horizon linear‐quadratic game. Our proposed algorithm is based on iterative optimization. Each agent obtains its own best response control strategy while estimating the other agent's state feedback gain from the state information and guaranteeing the stability of the whole system. We also discuss the performance of the proposed equilibrium‐seeking algorithm through numerical examples.

show abstract

Economically Enabled Energy Management: Overview and Research Opportunities

Cited by 4 publications

References 61 publications

Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand

Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand

Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand

Open‐loop equilibrium seeking in two‐agent noncooperative linear‐quadratic dynamic game with asymmetric horizon length

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About