Economic Methodology Applied to Political Hostage-Taking in Light of the Iran-Contra Affair

Terrorism and the media: An empirical analysis

“…Since recognition by the media is only one of several terrorist objectives, a rational terrorist would be expected to substitute increased media attention for other objectives and vice versa (Islam and Shahin, 1989). Furthermore, while some acts might be guaranteed to attract a lot of coverage, e.g.…”

“…(p. 16). Islam and Shahin (1989) explicitly include media attention in the terrorist's utility function and derive results which depend on this specification. Enders and Sandier (1991) find an empirical linkage between terrorism and international tourism-a link which depends mostly on media attention.…”

“…In addition, knowledge of this link helps governments to evaluate success of extant anti-terrorist policies in the presence of a free press since a successful government policy may be counteracted by media actions and vice versa. If terrorists are primarily motivated by media attention, then governments might design policy to minimize the media attention given to terrorist events or might trade media attention for other demands (implied in Sandier, Tschirhart, and Cauley, 1983, and explicitly modelled in Islam and Shahin, 1989). If terrorists are not motivated by media attention, policy makers lose a convenient scapegoat.…”

Exploring the dynamics between terrorism and anti-terror spending: Theory and UK-evidence

“…He employs various specifications of a potential terrorist's decision problem to explore the government's options in combating terrorism. In a similar vein, Islam and Shahin (1989) as well as Shahin and Islam (1992) study hostage taking. Of those papers which allow for strategic interaction between terrorists and the government, Selten (1977) and Lapan and Sandler (1988) investigate sequential games between kidnappers and the government.…”

Combating political hostage‐taking: An alternative approach

“…3 See, for example,Atkinson, Sandier and Tschirhart (1987),Sandier and Scott (1987),Lapan and Sandier (1988), andIslam and Shahin (1989).4 Issues of a mixed penalty-reward system have been addressed in the literature on tax evasion. Some of the questions asked concerned the optimal anti-tax-evasion policy (given a tax system and tax evasion) that guarantees the required tax revenues (seeFalkinger and Walther, 1991).…”