Economic crisis and youth unemployment: Comparing Greece and Ireland

Abstract

Both Greece and Ireland have long suffered high youth unemployment rates and have been pressured to restructure their employment and social systems under the European Employment Strategy. Problems were aggravated by the harsh conditions imposed by the Troika following bail-outs. Yet there was significant divergence in youth employment outcomes between Greece and Ireland despite a convergence of policies. In Ireland, tighter conditionality of benefits and stronger 'activation' were already on the agenda of the social actors, so their implementation was not forcefully contested. In Greece, the lack of effective social protection made it difficult for successive governments to build support for flexibilization, and the escalating insecurity of young Greeks and their families gave rise to social unrest and political instability. This contrast leads to a reappraisal of the convergence-divergence debate.

Youth‐oriented active labour market policies and economic crisis: Explaining policy effort in Greece and Portugal

“…In contrast to prior studies, this analysis stands in the middle arguing that convergence and divergence can be observed simultaneously (Papadopoulos, ; Kiess et al, ). High levels of problem pressure are expected to induce governments to adopt policy measures irrespective of existing policy arrangements (Tosun, Unt and Wadensjö, ).…”

“…Although the IMF’s engagement with the euro area and the subsequent support programmes did not leave sufficient scope for policy diversity (Thelen, ), we should not confuse such movement in the same direction with convergence (Papadopoulos, , p. 420). While both countries followed the road of internal devaluation, the countries under investigation exhibited disparity in their youth employment reform outcomes.…”

“…In contrast, in Greece the effort to reform EPL was halted. This is partly explained by the government’s lack of perseverance with the reform and its non‐confrontational position once it encountered the reluctance of social actors to embrace the idea that flexibility offered the “cure” to the “diseases” of the Greek labour market (Papadopoulos, , p. 414).…”

“…The Greek government justified the absence of consultation on the grounds that “it was not possible to accommodate participatory methods when Greece was about to default on its loans” (ILO, , p. 27). Trade unions took a militant stance, mobilizing workers and expressing public dissatisfaction (Papadopoulos, , p. 416), while they have repeatedly submitted complaints to both national and international judicial authorities, questioning whether the imposed measures were compatible with the Greek constitution and international labour agreements (European Commission, ). The communist‐led All‐Workers Militant Front (PAME) accused the General Confederation of Greek Workers of betraying young workers’ rights by negotiating wage and non‐wage reductions with employers and by agreeing short‐term and low‐paid employment programmes for young people (Papadopoulos, , p. 416).…”

“…The second MoU, in 2012, required unemployment benefits to be reduced by 22 per cent, while eligibility criteria were tightened and the duration of benefits reduced (EC, ). Most young people remained excluded from social protection, whereas the role of the family in protecting its young members was undermined (Papadopoulos, , p. 416). Two direct job creation schemes were adopted for the “Creation of a National Network of Direct Social Intervention for the Unemployed up to age 30”, which aimed at recruiting unemployed young people to staff social and cultural structures.…”